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CONSPIRACY TO ARBITRATE*
CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE**

Beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court has ushered in
a new Age of Arbitration in which firms can use
arbitration clauses to include otherwise unenforceable
terms in their contracts. This has allowed defendants to
shorten statutes of limitations, to limit damages, and to
prevent injunctive remedies altogether. Given the probusiness nature of arbitration clauses, mandatory
arbitration clauses have become standard in some
industries. Some industries may transition to market-wide
mandatory arbitration, in part, through conspiracies to
arbitrate. A conspiracy to arbitrate exists when the
competing firms in a market illegally agree that they will
all impose mandatory arbitration on their consumers.
This Article highlights the dangers of conspiracies to
impose arbitration, their illegality, and their utility in
concealing and protecting price-fixing conspiracies.
Despite the fact that conspiracies to arbitrate violate
antitrust law, courts have misapplied arbitration law in
ways that make such conspiracies profitable and perhaps
inevitable in some markets. Relying on the false premise
that Congress created a federal policy favoring
arbitration, federal courts have employed seemingly
neutral doctrines in ways that actively implement
conspiracies to arbitrate. For example, courts have
compelled antitrust plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims that
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defendants have conspired to impose arbitration, which
means courts are enforcing—instead of condemning—the
very agreement among competitors that they are supposed
to adjudicate. Courts have also misapplied equitable
doctrines and have given retroactive effect to arbitration
clauses. These judicial decisions protect both conspiracies
to arbitrate and price-fixing cartels.
The Article then presents a case study of recent litigation
involving an alleged conspiracy among banks that issue
credit cards to impose arbitration clauses on their
customers. Following a bench trial, the federal trial judge
held—and the Second Circuit affirmed—that the plaintiffs
failed to prove an agreement among the defendants to
impose arbitration clauses. In reaching this conclusion,
the court committed a litany of mistakes and ultimately
failed to recognize that it did, in fact, actually find an
illegal conspiracy to arbitrate. These errors flowed from
the court’s incorrect belief that Congress intended courts
to favor arbitration over litigation.
The Article concludes by proposing changes to the way
that courts evaluate conspiracy-to-arbitrate claims.
Federal courts are essentially complicit in antitrust
violations when they compel compliance with arbitration
clauses that are the product of alleged illegal conspiracies.
The Supreme Court’s rush to encourage and enforce
arbitration clauses should not blind lower courts to the
possibility that conspiracies to arbitrate are preventing the
free market from operating properly to protect consumer
interests.
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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court has ushered in a new
Age of Arbitration. Based on its assertion that Congress—when
enacting the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act—created a federal policy
favoring arbitration, the Court has issued a series of opinions that
make statutory claims subject to private arbitration. In the 2010s, the
Court expanded on its pro-arbitration jurisprudence and upheld the
enforceability of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, even when
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those clauses were held unconscionable under applicable state law.1
The Court also permitted businesses to insert class-action waivers into
their arbitration clauses, thus preventing victims of illegal activity
from participating in class-action litigation.2 The growing judicial
deference to arbitration clauses has provided firms the ability to
include otherwise unenforceable terms in their contracts, which may
allow defendants to shorten statutes of limitations, to limit damages,
and to prevent injunctive remedies altogether.3 Given the probusiness nature of arbitration clauses, mandatory arbitration clauses
have become standard in some industries. If mandatory arbitration
becomes the norm in a particular market, through individual firms
each deciding independently to impose arbitration clauses, then the
antitrust rules against collusion are not implicated.4
Some industries, however, may transition to market-wide
mandatory arbitration, in part, through conspiracies to arbitrate. A
conspiracy to arbitrate exists when the competing firms in a market
illegally agree that they will all impose mandatory arbitration on their
consumers. This Article explains how the Supreme Court’s relatively
recent arbitration opinions have converted arbitration clauses into a
mechanism that firms can use to insulate themselves from liability for
their illegal conduct. As a result, the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration
jurisprudence encourages and protects conspiracies to arbitrate.
This Article highlights the dangers of conspiracies to arbitrate.
Such conspiracies magnify all of the worst aspects of mandatory
arbitration by leaving consumers with little or no meaningful ability
to avoid relinquishing their rights to litigate in state and federal
courts. When all of the suppliers in a particular market require their
customers to submit to arbitration, consumers cannot purchase the
needed product or service without surrendering their rights.
Identifying the anticompetitive harms of conspiracies to arbitrate
over eighty-five years ago, the Supreme Court condemned such

1. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (finding
that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the California law that treated class-action
waivers in arbitration clauses as unconscionable).
2. See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)
(holding that the FAA does not allow courts to invalidate class-action waivers based on
fact that the cost of individual arbitrations exceeds the plaintiff’s potential recovery).
3. Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 282–92
(2015).
4. See Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 930 (1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer,
J.) (“Competitors cannot agree, for example, to insist that their contracts . . . contain
arbitration clauses, even though each individual competitor can make up his own mind to
insist upon such a term in any, or all, of his contracts.”).
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conspiracies as per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.5 If a
market transitions to industry-wide arbitration as a result of
independent decisions by each firm in the market, that may be tragic
but not necessarily illegal. Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns
only agreements in restraint of trade, not unilateral decision-making.
When, however, industry-wide arbitration results from an agreement
among competing firms to make mandatory arbitration the industry
standard, the agreement violates antitrust law. Unfortunately, as this
Article details, courts as of late have been more focused on protecting
the conspirators than on protecting consumers.
This Article explores how courts have developed a body of law
that encourages and rewards firms that conspire to impose arbitration
clauses on their customers. Most of these judgments are driven by the
incorrect belief that Congress intended to create an overarching
policy that reveres arbitration over litigation. This Article argues for
courts to treat conspiracies to arbitrate as per se illegal, to interpret
equitable and legal doctrines in a manner that discourages instead of
enables such conspiracies, and to not let the so-called federal policy in
favor of arbitration affect their decisions in conspiracy-to-arbitrate
cases.
Part I of this Article discusses the evolution of arbitration from a
method of settling inter-merchant disputes to a mechanism that
businesses use to prevent their customers from pursuing claims
altogether. The Supreme Court’s strong endorsement of arbitration
clauses has affected not merely the number, but also the content, of
these provisions in consumer contracts. Today, many businesses
structure their arbitration clauses to void many pro-consumer aspects
of otherwise applicable law, such as long statutes of limitations and
damage multipliers for successful plaintiffs. Used in this fashion,
arbitration undermines consumer law and antitrust law.
Recognizing that mandatory arbitration clauses are ubiquitous in
many industries, Part II hypothesizes that one reason for the
expansion might be collusion among competitors. The Supreme Court
first discussed conspiracies to impose arbitration clauses in 1930 in
Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States,6 which condemned
a conspiracy to arbitrate implemented by motion picture distributors
on movie theaters.7 The Court’s language indicates that conspiracies
to impose arbitration clauses are per se illegal. Since that opinion

5. See Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 43 (1930).
6. 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
7. Id. at 43.

96 N.C. L. REV. 381 (2018)

386

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

came down, no scholarship has analyzed the issue of conspiracies to
arbitrate.
Part II then presents a typology of conspiracies to arbitrate. Such
conspiracies can be primary conspiracies: that is, stand-alone
conspiracies untethered to any other illegal agreements among the
conspirators. Alternatively, a conspiracy to arbitrate can be a
secondary conspiracy when it is part of a larger antitrust conspiracy.
In this latter scenario, rivals in a market have already decided to
violate antitrust laws, for example, by fixing price. The agreement to
fix price is the primary conspiracy; the conspiracy to arbitrate is a
secondary conspiracy designed to conceal and protect the primary
conspiracy. Part II explains how both primary and secondary
conspiracies to arbitrate violate antitrust law.
Part III explores how courts have misapplied arbitration law in
ways that make conspiracies to arbitrate profitable and perhaps
inevitable in some markets. Prior to the Supreme Court’s proarbitration decisions, firms had little reason to conspire to impose
arbitration clauses on their customers. Now, relying on the false
premise that Congress created a federal policy favoring arbitration,
federal courts have employed seemingly neutral doctrines in ways
that actively enforce conspiracies to arbitrate. For example, courts
have compelled antitrust plaintiffs to arbitrate their conspiracy-toarbitrate claims, which means courts are enforcing—instead of
condemning—the very conspiracy that they are supposed to
adjudicate.8 Courts have also misapplied equitable doctrines and have
given retroactive effect to arbitration clauses.9 These judicial
decisions protect both conspiracies to arbitrate and price-fixing
cartels. Part III shows how all of these opinions flow from a
misreading of congressional intent regarding arbitration.
Part IV presents a case study of recent litigation involving an
alleged conspiracy to arbitrate among banks that issue credit cards.
Following a bench trial, a federal judge held, and the Second Circuit
affirmed, that the plaintiffs failed to prove an agreement among the
defendants to impose arbitration clauses.10 In reaching this
conclusion, the court committed a litany of mistakes and ultimately
failed to recognize that it did, in fact, actually find an illegal
conspiracy to arbitrate. This Part explains how these errors flowed

8. See infra Section III.B.
9. See infra Section III.C, III.D.
10. Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d sub nom.,
Ross v. Citigroup, Inc., 630 F. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2015).

96 N.C. L. REV. 381 (2018)

2017]

CONSPIRACY TO ARBITRATE

387

from the court’s incorrect belief that Congress intended courts to
favor arbitration over litigation.
Part V proposes changes to how courts evaluate conspiracy-toarbitrate claims. Federal courts are essentially complicit in antitrust
violations when they compel compliance with arbitration clauses that
are the product of alleged conspiracies. The Supreme Court’s rush to
encourage and enforce arbitration clauses should not blind lower
courts to the possibility that conspiracies to arbitrate are preventing
the free market from operating properly to protect consumer
interests.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF BINDING ARBITRATION
A. From Commercial Disputes to Consumer Contracts
The roots of arbitration lie in commercial disputes between
merchants, not disputes involving consumers. Arbitration of business
disputes is older than the nation itself.11 Until the early twentieth
century, however, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate were not
binding because either party could “repudiate arbitration agreements
at any time before the arbitrator’s award was made.”12 The old system
of private arbitration needed courts to enforce both the agreements
to arbitrate and the decisions of arbitrators—actions that American
judges were loath to take because they adhered to the English rule
that “traditionally considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as
‘ousting’ the courts of jurisdiction” and, thus, unenforceable.13
American courts followed the English rule with vigor until
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925.14
The core of the FAA—section 2—states that if a commercial contract
provides for private arbitration to settle any contract disputes, then
the promise to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.”15 The FAA was drafted and championed by business
groups, primarily in New York, that wanted to resolve their intermerchant disputes through private arbitration rather than public
11. James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial Review Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 745, 747 (2009).
12. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 32 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
13. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974); see, e.g., Home Ins.
Co. of N.Y. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874).
14. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)
(codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).
15. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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litigation.16 All of the congressional testimony, hearings, and reports
demonstrate that the FAA applied only to commercial disputes
between merchants.17 As enacted, the FAA was a relatively modest
law that allowed merchants to agree in advance to settle their trade
disputes through arbitration. Congress never intended the FAA to
apply to consumer contracts or to create any federal policy in favor of
arbitration.18 Nor did Congress intend the FAA to apply to
employment contracts.19
16. Leslie, supra note 3, at 302–06.
17. See, e.g., Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Fed.
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before Subcomm. of S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 10 (1923) (statement of W. H. H. Piatt, Chairman of the Comm.
of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, ABA) [hereinafter Arbitration Hearings]
(providing that the FAA applies to disputes involving “a contract between merchants one
with another, buying and selling goods” (emphasis added)).
18. Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Specifically, the
legislative history demonstrates that the Act’s purpose was solely to bind merchants who
were involved in commercial dealings.”), abrogated by Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105 (2001); IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF
MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 192–98 (2013) [hereinafter SZALAI,
OUTSOURCING JUSTICE]; Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 81, 117 (1992) (noting that the writings of the drafter of—and moving force
behind—the FAA “reveal[] an intent to devise a remedy entirely for commercial disputes
. . . between ‘merchants’”); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case
Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 467 (1996) (“The unrebutted legislative history
created prior to the FAA’s passage establishes that only disputes arising out of
commercial contracts were to be arbitrable; no agreements to arbitrate employment
disputes in any industry were to be included.”); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory
Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never
Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 106–08 (2006) (arguing that legislative
hearings of the FAA “make clear that the focus of the Act was merchant-to-merchant
arbitrations, never merchant-to-consumer arbitrations”); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing
Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 75–81 (1997) (analyzing legislative history of
FAA and concluding “that enforcement of arbitration clauses was intended to remain
within the sphere of the commercial paradigm” of contracts between merchants); Jean R.
Sternlight, Compelling Arbitration of Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866: What
Congress Could Not Have Intended, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 273, 310 (1999) (“When Congress
passed the FAA in 1925, it did not intend to allow employers or sellers of goods or services
to require employees or consumers of such goods or services to resolve civil rights disputes
through arbitration rather than in court. Nothing in the wording of the statute or in its
legislative history supports such an interpretation.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping
Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (2005) (noting that “to the
limited extent that the possibility of [business-consumer or employer-employee]
arbitration was considered by Congress in 1925, when it passed the FAA, those few who
spoke on the issue made clear that they did not view such a use of arbitration as
appropriate”); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 992 (1999) (“In the 1920s, most
supporters of the FAA and the state arbitration laws intended the new statutes to apply to
disputes between members of the same trade association or between participants in a
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After Congress enacted the FAA, federal courts initially obeyed
Congress’s intent and continued to disallow binding arbitration in
most contexts. For example, during the mid-twentieth century, the
Supreme Court held that pre-dispute arbitration clauses could not
reach federal statutory claims, such as securities fraud.20 The nonarbitrability of federal statutory claims extended to antitrust law.
Most famously, the Second Circuit in American Safety Equipment
Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.21 held that pre-dispute arbitration
agreements could not cover antitrust claims, which had to be decided
by federal judges.22 The Second Circuit reasoned, in part, that
antitrust law served the public interest and that private arbitration
could reduce plaintiffs’ incentives to investigate and pursue antitrust

common line of business.”); Imre Stephen Szalai, Correcting a Flaw in the Arbitration
Fairness Act, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 271, 278 (2013) [hereinafter Szalai, Correcting a Flaw]
(explaining why “the FAA was not intended to cover consumer disputes”).
19. Although this Article focuses mainly on arbitration clauses in the context of
consumer contracts, the arguments also apply to employment contracts. Many employers
require their employees to submit to mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment.
These contract terms fundamentally undermine the rights of workers.
Agreements among employers to force arbitration clauses on their respective
employees would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. Cf. Beltran v. InterExchange, Inc.,
176 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1079 (D. Colo. 2016) (finding alleged agreement to suppress au pair
wages would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act); In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig.,
856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding no-poaching agreements among
employers violate antitrust law). Some courts do not seem to fully appreciate this. See, e.g.,
Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 353 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he contention that an agreement
among competitors to insist on arbitration clauses in contracts with a category of
employees violates the antitrust law seems surprising.”).
The mistakes in the employee-arbitration context flow from the Supreme Court
holding that employment disputes are subject to mandatory arbitration. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). Such decisions are wrong as a matter of
legislative history because Congress did not intend the FAA to apply to employment
contracts. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 40 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he FAA specifically was intended to exclude arbitration agreements
between employees and employers.”); Szalai, Correcting a Flaw, supra note 18, at 277
(“The text of the FAA, its legislative history, and the history behind its enactment, clearly
reveal that the FAA was intended to facilitate the arbitration of commercial disputes
between merchants, and that labor or employment disputes were expressly removed from
the purview of the FAA.”); see also SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE, supra note 18, at
191 (“In light of the history of the arbitration reform movement, the Circuit City decision
is fundamentally flawed.”).
20. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
21. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
22. Id. at 827–28.
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actions.23 The American Safety doctrine proved influential nationally,
and antitrust claims were generally considered to be non-arbitrable.24
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court reimagined a different
legislative intent behind the FAA, which the Court claimed had
created an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution,”25 pursuant to which “questions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration.”26 In 1983, the Court asserted that “[t]he Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration
. . . .”27 As a result of this Court-driven expansion of the FAA,
antitrust claims, federal securities fraud claims, and RICO claims
could be decided in private arbitration,28 despite the public interest at
stake.
As the Court initially expanded the reach of arbitration clauses,
consumers could invoke two legal doctrines to prevent being forced
to arbitrate. First, the unconscionability doctrine makes
unconscionable contracts—and unconscionable contract terms—
unenforceable. Although unconscionability is a function of state law,
the FAA provides that federal courts should not enforce arbitration
agreements that violate applicable state law, such as the
unconscionability doctrine.29 Second, when an arbitration clause
covers federal statutory rights, the Effective Vindication Doctrine
provides that the “arbitration of the claim will not be compelled if the
prospective litigant cannot effectively vindicate his statutory rights in
the arbitral forum.”30 When the Supreme Court first held that federal
antitrust claims were subject to private arbitration, the justices
articulated the Effective Vindication Doctrine as a means to ensure
that the statutory rights of antitrust plaintiffs were still protected
because “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate
its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will
23. Id.
24. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 620–21
(1985).
25. Id. at 631.
26. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
27. Id. at 24–25; see also Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627 (“[T]he congressional policy
manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act . . . requires courts liberally to construe the
scope of arbitration agreements covered by that Act . . . .”).
28. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (RICO claims);
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636 (antitrust claims); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 223 (1985) (securities claims).
29. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
30. In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2007).

96 N.C. L. REV. 381 (2018)

2017]

CONSPIRACY TO ARBITRATE

391

continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”31 Thus,
the Court permitted statutory claims to be removed from public
courts only because it assumed plaintiffs could still effectively
vindicate their rights in private arbitration.32
The Supreme Court, however, has effectively eliminated both of
these pro-consumer doctrines—the unconscionability defense and the
Effective Vindication Doctrine—when an arbitration clause includes
a class-action waiver. A class-action waiver requires would-be
plaintiffs to neither bring nor participate in class-action litigation
against the business with whom the customers entered the contract.
Through contracts of adhesion, firms can use arbitration clauses to
impose class-action waivers on their customers. Because individual
actions may be economically infeasible, these class-action waivers can
effectively immunize wrongdoers from scrutiny altogether when the
cost of pursuing individual action exceeds the maximum potential
damage award.33 In this situation, no victim will bring even a
meritorious claim that is certain to win, and the law-breaking firm
gets to keep all of its ill-gotten gains. Given the effects of class-action
waivers, a strong argument can be made that arbitration clauses that
include class-action waivers are unconscionable and violate the
Effective Vindication Doctrine.
Instead, the Supreme Court has held that the Court-created
presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses trumps both of
these pro-consumer legal doctrines. In AT&T v. Concepcion,34 the
Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted state statutes and
judicial decisions that treated class-action waivers embedded in
arbitration clauses as unconscionable.35 Although many states
prohibit the enforcement of class-action waivers in traditional
contracts without arbitration clauses,36 the Court in Concepcion held
these laws inapplicable when the class-action waiver resides in an
arbitration clause.37 The decision provided a road map to firms
wishing to eliminate class actions: put an otherwise unenforceable

31. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636–37.
32. See id.
33. See infra notes 39–43.
34. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
35. Id. at 341.
36. Leslie, supra note 3, at 277–78.
37. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339, 351 (reasoning that the FAA preempted state laws
that considered class-action waivers embedded in arbitration clauses to be unconscionable
and, thus, unenforceable).
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class-action waiver into an arbitration clause and thereby put the
waiver beyond the reach of the unconscionability doctrine.38
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,39 the
Supreme Court effectively eliminated the Effective Vindication
Doctrine as a means to ensure that victims of illegal business conduct
can seek a meaningful remedy.40 The Italian Colors Court considered
whether the Effective Vindication Doctrine precluded an antitrust
defendant from enforcing a class-action waiver in an arbitration
clause when the cost of pursuing an individual claim could surpass $1
million while the maximum possible recovery was less than $40,000.41
A closely divided Court held that “a contractual waiver of class
arbitration is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act when the
plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim
exceeds the potential recovery.”42 Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia claimed that victims of antitrust violations still had a right to
pursue their claims in individual arbitration, even if no rational
plaintiff would do so because the cost exceeded the maximum
recovery.43 By asserting that “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an
affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim,”44
Justice Scalia effectively abolished the Effective Vindication Doctrine
as a means to protect plaintiffs from unfair mandatory arbitration
clauses.45 Businesses can now use arbitration clauses to impose classaction waivers on their customers, which makes individual claims
against a law-breaking firm too uneconomical to pursue.
B.

The Growth of Pro-Defendant Arbitration Clauses in Consumer
Contracts

The Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence encouraged
businesses to compel their customers to waive their access to court. In
many industries, most of the major firms include mandatory
arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts.46 For example, the

38. Leslie, supra note 3, at 292–95.
39. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
40. See id. at 2307, 2310.
41. Id. at 2308.
42. Id. at 2307.
43. See id. at 2311.
44. Id. at 2309.
45. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Merger
Approval, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2015).
46. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) § 1.4.1, at 9–10 (2015) (finding that most firms in the banking,
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau found that 98.5% of licensed
storefronts for payday loans and that “[s]even of the eight largest
facilities-based mobile wireless providers (87.5%), covering 99.9% of
subscribers,” imposed arbitration clauses on their customers.47 As a
result, “[t]ens of millions of consumers use consumer financial
products or services that are subject to pre-dispute arbitration
clauses.”48 Because almost all of these clauses contain class-action
waivers,49 this can make it hard—if not impossible—for consumers to
protect their right to litigate.
The inability of consumers to avoid arbitration clauses can
fundamentally undermine laws designed to protect consumer
interests.50 Mandatory arbitration clauses favor defendants in a
number of important ways. The calculus of arbitration clauses is far
different in consumer contracts than commercial contracts. In
relationships between commercial parties, buyers and sellers are
similarly likely to be the plaintiff or defendant. In consumer litigation,
the probability of litigation positions is highly asymmetrical: the seller
is far more likely to be the defendant in any dispute, and the
consumer the plaintiff. As a result, if businesses can structure their
arbitration clauses to include pro-defendant terms, businesses can
channel customer complaints into arbitration and then undermine
many aspects of consumer protection law.
1. Pro-Defendant Process
By forcing consumer-initiated disputes into arbitration,
businesses can reduce their likelihood of liability because the
arbitration process favors defendants in consumer litigation in three
important ways. First, arbitration generally provides for less discovery

credit card, prepaid card provider, payday loan, private student loan, and mobile wireless
provider industries included arbitration clauses in contracts).
47. Id. § 2.3, at 7; see also id. § 2.3.4 (detailing payday loan industry’s use of arbitration
clauses); id. § 2.3.6 (detailing mobile wireless providers’ use of arbitration clauses).
48. Id. § 1.4.1, at 9.
49. Id. § 1.4.1, at 10 (“Across each product market, 85–100% of the contracts with
arbitration clauses—covering close to 100% of market share subject to arbitration in the
six product markets studied—include such no-class arbitration provisions.”).
50. See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124
YALE L.J. 3052, 3082 (2015) (“[I]f exculpation is buried in the fine print of a maze of
difficult-to-understand procedural provisions, then the result is private legal reform largely
removed from public scrutiny as well as judicial scrutiny.”); see also Myriam Gilles, The
Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 376
(2016) (“For the entire categories of cases that are ushered into [arbitration]—from
consumer law, to employment law, to much of antitrust law—common law doctrinal
development will cease.”).
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than traditional litigation. The parties in arbitration have less access
to depositions, interrogatories, document requests, motions to
compel, third-party documents and testimony,51 and foreign-based
evidence.52 Limited discovery generally favors the defendants in
consumer-initiated litigation because consumers are more likely to
need the defendants’ documents to prove their case than the
defendants are going to need any documents from the consumers to
mount a defense.53 Furthermore, arbitration may empower
defendants to simply refuse to produce damning documents. Because
arbitrators are generally less aggressive regarding discovery and
federal courts defer to arbitrators in discovery disputes,54 defendants
in arbitration may be more emboldened to withhold incriminating
documents.55
Second, the adjudication and review procedures in arbitration
may favor defendants. Arbitrators can grant the equivalent of
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss against a plaintiff, and the
plaintiff has no meaningful recourse.56 Even an arbiter’s mistakes of
law may be insufficient to justify judicial correction of an arbiter’s
51. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 14–17; see Donald I. Baker & Mark R. Stabile,
Arbitration of Antitrust Claims: Opportunities and Hazards for Corporate Counsel, 48 BUS.
L. 395, 410 (1993) (noting “the difficulties in acquiring evidence from unwilling third
parties” in antitrust arbitration); Charles E. Buffon & Joshua D. Wolson, Antitrust
Arbitration Counseling, 19 ANTITRUST 31, 32 (2004) (“[S]ome arbitration rules do not
permit depositions . . . . Similarly, arbitration rules can be selected that do not allow
document discovery that is as broad as that permitted under federal and state procedural
rules . . . .”); Thomas Campbell, Roxane Busey & Peter Koch, Arbitrating Antitrust
Claims—The Road Less Traveled, 19 ANTITRUST 8, 8 (2004) (“[D]epositions,
interrogatories, document requests, . . . motions to compel, . . . [and] third-party discovery
. . . are generally disfavored [in arbitration].”); Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, CrowdClassing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 464
n.66 (2014) (“For example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Healthcare
Payor Provider Arbitration Rules . . . limit discovery to one deposition per party unless
ordered by the arbitrator.”); Elizabeth B. McCallum & R. Mark McCareins, Arbitration
Procedures: The Rules of the Road in Arbitrating Antitrust Disputes, 19 ANTITRUST 15, 18
(2004) (“The circuits are split on whether the arbitrators have authority under the FAA to
order third-party production of evidence before the arbitration hearing . . . .”); see also
Integrity Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 71–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1995),
abrogated on other grounds by Life Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London,
549 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2008).
52. Baker & Stabile, supra note 51, at 411 (“The problem of third-party discovery in
arbitration is generally more complex in the international context.”).
53. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1426, 2004 WL 7200711,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2004) (noting that “in antitrust actions, . . . ‘the proof is largely in
the hands of the alleged conspirators’” (quoting Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847
F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1988)).
54. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2006).
55. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 16.
56. See McCallum & McCareins, supra note 51, at 19.
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errors.57 Although judicial review of arbitration decisions is
theoretically possible, it is functionally non-existent.58 Even when an
arbiter’s mistakes are dispositive, courts treat arbitration decisions as
“final and effectively unappealable.”59 Coupled with the fact that
many arbiters are liable to be biased in favor of business defendants,60
the absence of a meaningful appeals process is particularly troubling.
Third, private arbitration is, by definition, private. The
confidentiality of the process makes it harder to hold defendants
accountable in the court of public opinion. More importantly,
confidentiality provisions likely prevent plaintiffs from learning about
the arguments and outcomes of previous arbitration proceedings
against the defendants. Indeed, some arbitration provisions explicitly
forbid coordination and information sharing among private
plaintiffs.61 All of this gives the defendant, who is a repeat player62
and can learn much from its previous arbitrations, an informational
advantage over individual plaintiffs.
2. Pro-Defendant Terms
In addition to a process that generally favors defendants,
businesses often write their arbitration clauses to include specific
terms that are designed to negate many pro-plaintiff aspects of
consumer protection laws. Despite the fact that many judges would
find such terms unenforceable in court-based litigation, arbiters may
enforce these anti-plaintiff terms.63 This section reviews several

57. See Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Payne, 374 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2004)
(“[E]rrors of law are not reviewable. Even if we would have reached a different
conclusion, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the arbitrators.”).
58. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 20–22; McCallum & McCareins, supra note 51,
at 21 (“Thus, the arbitrator’s ‘“improvident, even silly, fact-finding” does not provide a
basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award.’” (quoting Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001)).
59. Buffon & Wolson, supra note 48, at 33; see SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE,
supra note 18, at 7 (“Courts have described the judicial review of arbitrator’s awards as
‘one of the narrowest standards of judicial review in all of American jurisprudence,’ and
even if an arbitrator was wrong in interpreting or applying the law, the arbitrator’s flawed
award will still stand.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home
Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2005))); John J. Finn, Private Arbitration and Antitrust
Enforcement: A Conflict of Policies, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 406, 413 (1969).
60. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 17–20.
61. Leslie, supra note 3, at 290–91.
62. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in
Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19
(1999) (arguing that alternative dispute resolution participants with more resources and
experience have more favorable outcomes).
63. Leslie, supra note 3, at 282.
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categories of terms in arbitration clauses that circumvent pro-plaintiff
laws.
Damage Limitations. Many consumer laws provide for more than
compensatory damages. Exemplary damages, such as punitive
damages, can deter future violations of the law.64 To emphasize the
importance of enhanced-damages provisions, many statutes preclude
parties from waiving them.65 Independent of statutory prohibitions,
state courts may decline to enforce contract provisions that purport to
prohibit money damages altogether.66 Many firms have sought to
evade such laws and rulings by including damage-limitation
provisions in their arbitration clauses, which often prohibit punitive
damages, incidental damages, or any other damages greater than
simple compensatory damages.67 While some arbitration clauses
explicitly cap damages,68 others strip arbiters of any “authority to
award any punitive or exemplary damages” or “extra contractual
damages of any kind . . . .”69 Many of these contractual damagelimitation provisions would be unenforceable in court, but they may
be enforced in arbitration.70 At least some judges have acknowledged
this asymmetry that allows firms to use arbitration to limit damages in
ways that courts would not countenance.71

64. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
65. See, e.g., Capital Equip., Inc. v. CNH Am., LLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (E.D.
Ark. 2006); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Gessa
v. Manor Care of Fla., Inc., 86 So. 3d 484, 493 (Fla. 2011).
66. See, e.g., Health Net of Cal., Inc. v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 235,
237–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (invalidating an insurance contract clause that prohibited the
recovery of damages).
67. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, § 2.5.6, at 47 (“Damages
limitations in prepaid card contracts with arbitration clauses were more frequent, and
almost always precluded recovery of both punitive and consequential damages.”); Leslie,
supra note 3, at 284–86 (collecting cases); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and
Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1001, 1025 (1996).
68. See, e.g., Crewe v. Rich Dad Educ., LLC, 884 F. Supp. 2d 60, 67–68 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
69. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 405 (2003); accord Captain
Bounce, Inc. v. Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11–CV–858 JLS (WMC), 2012 WL 928412, at *2
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2012) (“The arbitrator at such arbitration shall not be entitled to award
punitive damages to any party, and the costs and fees of such arbitration shall be borne by
the losing party.”).
70. Leslie, supra note 3, at 284–86; see, e.g., Larry’s United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253
F.3d 1083, 1085–86 (8th Cir. 2001) (allowing arbiter to determine enforceability of a
damage-limitation provision).
71. See Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 800 (8th Cir.
2004).
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Anti-Injunction Terms. Injunctive relief plays an important role
in many areas of consumer law. Judges have the inherent power to
enjoin future violations of the law and also to require defendants to
remedy the effects of their prior violations. Although courts will not
enforce contractual provisions that preemptively waive a customer or
employee’s right to injunctive relief,72 some businesses include antiinjunction language in their arbitration clauses.73 Arbiters may be
more likely to enforce contractual provisions that prohibit injunctive
relief.74 Even in the absence of anti-injunction language, funneling
disputes into arbitration reduces the likelihood of law-breaking firms
facing injunctive measures because arbiters lack the authority to issue
injunctions75 or the competence to devise and enforce effective
injunctive relief.
Fee-Shifting Provisions. Some consumer laws contain proplaintiff one-way fee-shifting provisions, which means that a
successful plaintiff can recover attorneys’ fees but a successful
defendant cannot.76 Such provisions encourage plaintiffs to bring
colorable claims, especially those with low compensatory damages
that would otherwise render a lawsuit too uneconomical to bring.77
Firms likely to be defendants in litigation have attempted to blunt
pro-plaintiff fee-shifting provisions by trying to contract around them,
but many courts have rejected such contractual evasions of the law.78
72. Leslie, supra note 3, at 286.
73. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., LLC, No. 3:13–cv–576–J–34JRK, 2014 WL
757942, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2014) (noting arbitration provision stating that “the
arbitrator . . . will not issue injunctive relief”).
74. See Myriam Gilles, Individualized Injunctions and No-Modification Terms:
Challenging “Anti-Reform” Provisions in Arbitration Clauses, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469,
472 (2015) (“‘[A]nti-reform’ provisions . . . prohibit an individual arbitral claimant from
seeking to end a practice, change a rule, or enjoin an act that causes injury to itself and to
similarly-situated non-parties.”).
75. Gilles & Sebok, supra note 51, at 465 (“[B]ecause arbitrators lack the authority to
enjoin ongoing wrongful activity, each claimant bringing a separate claim has no overall
impact on policy or practices that have widespread effect.”).
76. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2012); Kirby v. Immoos Fire Prot., Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr.
3d 173, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (referring to “one-way fee-shifting provision” in
California Labor Code section 1194).
77. Leslie, supra note 3, at 287; see Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d
547, 548–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).
78. See, e.g., Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 601 F. App’x 461, 463 (9th Cir.
2014); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 485 F. App’x 403, 406 (11th Cir. 2012)
(finding fee-shifting provision unconscionable because it required a “customer to pay the
bank’s costs in any dispute between the customer and the bank regardless of who
prevails”); Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 112 (N.J. 2006); see also Byram
Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prod. Co. of N.J., 374 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1967)
(“We hold that in the absence of specific legislative authorization attorneys’ fees may not
be awarded to defendants in private anti-trust litigation.”); LaCoursiere v. Camwest Dev.,
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Undeterred, firms have tried to circumvent pro-plaintiff fee-shifting
laws by drafting their arbitration clauses to preclude all fee shifting,79
to mandate two-way “loser pays” fee shifting,80 or even to impose prodefendant, one-way fee shifting such that only the successful
defendant can recover costs.81 Such provisions can deter plaintiffs
from bringing meritorious litigation.82 While courts are prone to reject
such attempts as unconscionable,83 some courts defer to arbiters on
these matters.84
Truncated Statutes of Limitations. Firms may also use arbitration
clauses to shorten statutes of limitations. Many consumer protection
laws have relatively generous statutes of limitations,85 and several
states prohibit contracting parties from shortening the statutes of
limitations.86 In contrast, other states grant parties some ability to
Inc., 339 P.3d 963, 970 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (citing cases finding pro-defendant one-way
fee shifting unconscionable).
79. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The agreement precludes any shifting of costs to Amex, even if
Italian Colors prevails.”); Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. SACV 03-130 DOC, 2003
WL 21530185, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003) (“[E]ach party will pay the fees and costs of
its own counsel, experts and witnesses . . . .”).
80. See, e.g., Captain Bounce, Inc. v. Bus. Fin. Servs., No. 11-CV-858-JLS (WMC),
2012 WL 928412, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2012) (“[T]he costs and fees of such arbitration
shall be borne by the losing party.”); see also In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust
Litig., 700 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2012); Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness:
Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 859 (2012) (discussing examples of “loser
pays” fee shifting).
81. See, e.g., Samaniego v. Empire Today LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499–500 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2012) (finding arbitration clauses unconscionable, in part, because they
“require[d] plaintiffs to pay any attorneys’ fees incurred by [the defendant] but impose[d]
no reciprocal obligation on [the defendant]”).
82. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 635 (2012) (noting that
fee-shifting provisions can chill plaintiffs from bringing suit because the suit’s “financial
burdens [would be] so prohibitive as to deter the bringing of claims”); see also Delta
Funding Corp., 912 A.2d at 112 (“The prospect of having to shoulder all the costs of
arbitration could chill . . . consumers from pursuing their statutory claims through
mandatory arbitration.”).
83. See supra note 78.
84. See Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 232 (Tex. 2014) (holding
that the issue of unconscionability of fee-shifting provision is for the arbiter to decide).
85. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1679i (2012) (providing that the Credit Repair Organizations
Act has a five-year statute of limitations).
86. See ALA. CODE § 6-2-15 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“[A]ny
agreement or stipulation, verbal or written, whereby the time for the commencement of
any action is limited to a time less than that prescribed by law for the commencement of
such action is void.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.03 (West 2017) (“Any provision in a contract
fixing the period of time within which an action arising out of the contract may be begun
at a time less than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations is void.”); In re
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contractually truncate the applicable statute of limitations,87 but only
if the contractually imposed limitations period is not “unreasonably
short.”88 Courts may refuse to enforce contractually-truncated
limitations periods that are too short, treating the contract provision
as substantively unconscionable.89 Some firms try to use arbitration to
avoid litigating in courts before judges who would invalidate a
contract provision that significantly truncates the applicable statute of
limitations.90 Arbiters may have more latitude and willingness to
enforce contractually shortened statutes of limitations.91 When
defendants are able to truncate statutes of limitation, lawbreakers
may prevent their victims from pursuing meritorious claims.
Class-Action Waivers. Arbitration clauses increasingly contain
class-action waivers. In its recent report on arbitration clauses in the
financial sector, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau found
that “[n]early all the arbitration clauses studied include provisions

Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 287 n.8 (4th Cir. 2007) (“South Carolina law
prohibits contractual shortening of statutes of limitation.”); Honeywell, Inc. v. Ruby
Tuesday, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1078 (D. Minn. 1999) (describing shortening of statutes
of limitations as “illegal per se”).
87. See, e.g., Sanders v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, No. 3:07-cv-918-J-33HTS,
2008 WL 150479, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2008); Blue Shield of Cal. Life & Health Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 713, 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Wilson Fertilizer &
Grain, Inc. v. ADM Milling Co., 654 N.E.2d 848, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Nez v. Forney,
1989-NMSC-074, ¶ 7–8, 109 N.M. 161, 783 P.2d 471.
88. Bd. of Supervisors v. Sampson, 369 S.E.2d 178, 180 (Va. 1988) (permitting parties
to alter a statute of limitations “if the contractual provision is not against public policy and
if the agreed time is not unreasonably short”); see Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341
F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We recognize that a provision limiting the time to bring a
claim or provide notice of such a claim to the defendant is not necessarily unfair or
otherwise unconscionable. But such a time period must still be reasonable.”); Hambrecht
& Quist Venture Partners v. Am. Med. Int’l, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 43 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (“As for shortening the limitations period, the courts will enforce the parties’
agreement provided it is reasonable.”).
89. Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 601 F. App’x 461, 463 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he contract’s sixth-month limitations period is substantively unconscionable.”); see
also Shahin v. I.E.S. Inc., 988 N.E.2d 873, 875 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (“The limitations
period set out in the contract is one year from the date of the contract . . . . The limitations
period thus expired one year from the date of the contract—regardless of the date of any
alleged breach or its discovery . . . . [I]t is therefore invalid and unenforceable.”).
90. Leslie, supra note 3, at 284.
91. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 13–22 (describing arbiters’ wide discretion
and potential bias when applying law); Edward J. Underhill, Statutes of Limitation and
Arbitration: Limiting Your Client’s Exposure, 101 ILL. B.J. 244, 244 (2013) (“Contrary to
what many lawyers think, it’s not safe to assume general statutes of limitation
automatically apply to Illinois arbitration claims. That’s why you should consider including
a clause limiting your client’s exposure in your arbitration agreements.”).
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stating that arbitration may not proceed on a class basis.”92 These
waivers often deny individual victims of illegal conduct any remedy
because “consumers almost never initiate individual claims against
companies in arbitration.”93 Thus, arbitration clauses with class-action
waivers can effectively eliminate the defendant’s liability outright.94
While state courts may refuse to enforce class-action waivers in
litigation because of the Supreme Court’s Concepcion opinion, state
judges are powerless to stop the enforcement of arbitration clauses
that require the arbiter to enforce the class-action waiver.95 Similarly,
federal judges must defer to class-action waivers if embedded in an
arbitration clause.
In sum, arbitration clauses today bear little resemblance to the
arbitration clauses of the 1920s, when Congress enacted the FAA.
Businesses appear less interested in using arbitration to settle their
inter-merchant disputes96 and more interested in using arbitration
clauses to deny their customers meaningful access to the court
system.97
II. CONSPIRACIES TO ARBITRATE
What explains the growth of arbitration clauses? The
proliferation of arbitration clauses could be the result of firms
independently realizing the pro-business benefits of mandatory
arbitration and, consequently, unilaterally inserting arbitration
clauses into their consumer contracts. No business wants to be a
92. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, § 1.4.1, at 10 (“Across each
product market, 85–100% of the contracts with arbitration clauses—covering close to
100% of market share subject to arbitration in the six product markets studied—include
such no-class arbitration provisions.”).
93. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers
from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 98 (2012).
94. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 37.
95. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340, 357 (2011).
96. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 876 (2008) (finding that, for firms that impose
arbitration clauses on their customers and employees, “less than 10% of their negotiated
non-consumer, non-employment contracts included arbitration clauses”); see also
MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW 280 n.26 (2013) (interpreting the Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin study as
“provid[ing] evidence that avoiding class actions is the principal purpose of many
arbitration clauses”).
97. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at 22 (“Corporations said that class
actions were not needed because arbitration enabled individuals to resolve their
grievances easily. But court and arbitration records show the opposite has happened: Once
blocked from going to court as a group, most people dropped their claims entirely.”).
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defendant in state or federal court. Mandatory arbitration provides a
way for firms to avoid court altogether, even if they have broken the
law. Thus, it may be tempting for businesses to simply require all
customers to submit to arbitration. However, given the anti-consumer
nature of arbitration clauses, a firm that unilaterally imposes
mandatory arbitration may lose customers to other competitors who
do not require mandatory arbitration. Firms want to attain the probusiness advantages of mandatory arbitration without losing business
to rivals. The solution may be to agree with one’s competitors that all
of the firms in the relevant market will insert arbitration clauses in
their consumer contracts. This Part discusses the legality and
dynamics of such conspiracies to arbitrate.
A. The Illegality of Early Efforts to Impose Arbitration Through
Collusion
The Supreme Court first analyzed conspiracies to arbitrate in
1930 in Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States.98 Ten movie
distributors, responsible for distributing sixty percent of the films
exhibited by 25,000 theater owners (referred to as “exhibitors”),
agreed to impose a standard contract on all exhibitors.99 Section 18 of
this standard contract provided that “each party shall submit any
controversy that may arise to a board of arbitration . . . .”100
Consequently, the distributors agreed with each other to require
mandatory arbitration for all disputes, forcing exhibitors to
preemptively waive their right to a jury trial for any contractual
disputes.101 As an enforcement mechanism, the distributor-drafted
standardized contract provided that if any exhibitor refused to
arbitrate or to comply with an arbitration award to any one
distributor, then all of the distributors were required to demand
security deposits from that exhibitor.102 Through this provision, the
distributors could collectively enforce the arbitration clauses of
individual distributors. The Department of Justice challenged section
18 as a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.103 In no uncertain

98. 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
99. Id. at 36–37 (“Under an agreement amongst themselves Appellant Distributors
will only contract with Exhibitors according to the terms of the Standard Exhibition
Contract . . . .”).
100. Id. at 37–38.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 40.
103. Id. at 36; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (condemning agreements that unreasonably
restrain trade).
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terms, the Supreme Court held the distributors’ agreement to impose
mandatory arbitration on the exhibitors violated antitrust law.104
In condemning section 18 of the standardized contracts, the
Supreme Court in Paramount Famous Lasky appeared to hold that
conspiracies to arbitrate are per se illegal. The per se rule in antitrust
law is categorical. When an agreement falls in a per se category, it is
condemned without proof that the particular agreement unreasonably
restrains trade.105 The per se rule applies to categories of restraint
“that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition”106
and that “lack . . . any redeeming virtue . . . .”107 Traditional
categories of “per se illegality include horizontal price fixing among
competitors, group boycotts, and horizontal market division
. . . .”108 If their agreement falls in a per se category, antitrust
defendants are precluded from arguing that their agreement is
justified by a legitimate business reason, such as the industry-specific
context.109
Several aspects of the Paramount Famous Lasky opinion point to
the Court using a per se approach. For example, the Court agreed
with the government’s characterization that the agreement among
distributors had “the necessary and inevitable tendency . . . to
produce material and unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce
in violation of the Sherman Act.”110 This is the lexicon of per se
illegality in antitrust law. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the
distributors’ agreement “necessarily and directly tends to destroy ‘the
kind of competition to which the public has long looked for
protection.’”111 This, again, is similar to the language that modern
courts use when condemning an agreement as per se illegal.112
104. See Paramount Famous Lasky, 282 U.S. at 43.
105. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“Under the usual logic of the per se rule, a restraint on trade
that rarely serves any purposes other than to restrain competition is illegal without proof
of market power or anticompetitive effect.”), abrogated on other grounds by Ill. Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
106. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
289–90 (1985) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20
(1979)).
107. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
108. Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2010).
109. See Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 486 (1st Cir. 1988).
110. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 41 (1930).
111. Id. at 43 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Am. Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371,
390 (1923)).
112. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–50 (1977) (“Per se rules
of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly
anticompetitive.”). In contrast, vertical restraints do not fall within the per se rule because
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The Paramount Famous Lasky opinion’s per se approach to
conspiracies to arbitrate is also reflected in the Court’s refusal to
credit any of the defendants’ industry-specific justifications for why
the conspiracy to arbitrate at issue did not unreasonably restrain
trade. Specifically, the Court held that the fact that the standard
contract and its arbitration provision were the product of “six years of
discussion and experimentation” could not render valid a
combination that “unduly restrain[s] competition.”113 The Court both
conceded and rejected the possibility that the conspiracy to arbitrate
improved the efficiency of the motion picture industry.114 The
rejection of industry-specific justifications is a hallmark of antitrust
law’s per se rule.115 Similarly, the Court stated that the defendants’
“good motives” were not relevant and provided no defense.116 This
decision again mirrors the per se rule, as courts only consider the
defendants’ intent when applying the rule of reason, but not when the
agreement falls in a per se category.117 In sum, Paramount Famous
Lasky treated conspiracies to arbitrate as per se illegal.118
“vertical agreements do not necessarily threaten an injury to competition.” Brantley v.
NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2012).
113. Paramount Famous Lasky, 282 U.S. at 43 (quoting E. States Retail Lumber
Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 613 (1914)).
114. Id. (“It may be that arbitration is well adapted to the needs of the motion picture
industry; but when under the guise of arbitration parties enter into unusual arrangements
which unreasonably suppress normal competition their action becomes illegal.”).
115. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (stating that agreements
falling in a per se category are “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 909 (6th Cir.
2003) (“To reiterate, the virtue/vice of the per se rule is that it allows courts to presume
that certain behaviors as a class are anticompetitive without expending judicial resources
to evaluate the actual anticompetitive effects or procompetitive justifications in a
particular case.”).
116. Paramount Famous Lasky, 282 U.S. at 44 (quoting Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912)).
117. XI HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1911, at 266 (1998) (“[U]nder the
per se rule power, intent, effect, and most defenses are irrelevant; under the rule of reason
all are essential.”); see, e.g., Feminist Women’s Health Ctr., Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F.
Supp. 1258, 1262 (N.D. Fla. 1976) (“[E]vidence of the good intentions of defendants has
historically been deemed irrelevant in per se cases.”).
118. Some courts and commentators have recognized that the Paramount Famous
Lasky Court took a per se approach. See U.S. Trotting Ass’n v. Chicago Downs Ass’n, 665
F.2d 781, 789 (7th Cir. 1981) (characterizing Paramount Famous Lasky as a per se case,
“involv[ing] conduct that can only be anticompetitive,” namely “cartelization to require
acceptance of a standard form contract”); id. at 794 (Bauer, J., dissenting) (“The courts
clearly have the requisite experience with group boycotts to hold that they are per se
unlawful.”) (citing, among other cases, Paramount Famous Lasky); see Joseph P. Bauer,
Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 685, 688 (1979) (“The Court in Paramount did not discuss whether the per se rule
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Even without the precedent of Paramount Famous Lasky, a
conspiracy to arbitrate satisfies the criteria for per se condemnation.
Such conspiracies “always or almost always tend to restrict
competition”119 because with a conspiracy to arbitrate in place, rivals
do not compete with respect to this important contract term.

should be extended to include concerted refusals to deal; its decision, however, is difficult
to justify solely under the rule of reason. There was virtually no discussion of the nature of
the injury, either to the parties or to the public, of how competition would be affected, or
even of why the practice was ‘unreasonable.’ In short, the Court was unwilling to consider
the potential benefits of these agreements.”); see also Edward Brunet & David J.
Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure and Substance After Northwest Wholesale
Stationers: Evolving Antitrust Approaches to Pleadings, Burden of Proof, and Boycotts, 72
VA. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (1986) (“Although the Paramount Famous Lasky decision did not
contain language terming group refusals to deal per se illegal, the Court refused to give
detailed consideration to the reasonableness of the restraints and failed to discuss why the
contract at issue was illegal or how any economic injury occurred.”).
Some lower courts, however, have not treated Paramount Famous Lasky as a per
se case. See, e.g., De Jong Packing Co. v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 618 F.2d 1329,
1335 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The Supreme Court did not indicate in Paramount Famous
Lasky Corp. or First National Pictures, Inc., whether it was proceeding under the rule of
reason or whether it deemed the practices in question illegal per se.”). This
misinterpretation stems from courts improperly obsessing on the phrase “per se illegality,”
which the Court did not use. Although Paramount Famous Lasky did not use the phrase
“per se illegal,” that is neither surprising nor dispositive. The case was decided in 1930,
and the Supreme Court did not explicitly refer to price-fixing agreements as per se illegal
until 1940. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), hinted at per se illegality by denying
defendants the ability to argue that price fixing is legal if the fixed price is reasonable, but
the Court did not employ the “per se” terminology. Id. at 397–98. While not using the
phrase “per se” itself, see id., the Court nonetheless used language that has become the
hallmark of per se illegality.
Other per se cases of the era did not explicitly say “per se” either. For example,
the Paramount Famous Lasky Court cited Eastern States Lumber Ass’n v. United States,
234 U.S. 600 (1914), a decision that treated a concerted refusal to deal as per se illegal. Id.
at 614. Like Paramount Famous Lasky, the Eastern States opinion did not use the phrase
“per se illegality,” but Eastern States is nonetheless considered to be a per se case. See, e.g.,
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Eastern
States as an example of behavior warranting “per se condemnation”); Vogel v. Am. Soc. of
Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1984) (describing Eastern States as “the Supreme
Court’s first case holding that a boycott was illegal per se”); M&H Tire Co. v. Hoosier
Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 977 (1st Cir. 1984) (describing Eastern States as holding
that “horizontal collaboration among lumber retailers [is] considered per se illegal”); E.A.
McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consol. Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186 (5th Cir.
1972) (citing Eastern States as a “case[] applying per se illegality to collective refusals to
deal”).
119. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
289–90 (1985) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S 1, 19–20
(1979)).
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Certainly, a conspiracy to arbitrate lacks “any redeeming virtue.”120
Even if an individual arbitration clause is defensible,121 there is still no
justification for conspiring to impose such clauses throughout a
market.122
Therefore, because the Paramount Famous Lasky Court applied
a per se approach, conspiracies to arbitrate are categorically illegal. A
conspiracy to arbitrate is considered unreasonably anticompetitive, as
a matter of law. Once the plaintiff proves the agreement, antitrust
liability is established.123
After the Paramount Famous Lasky Court condemned
conspiracies to arbitrate as violating the Sherman Act, the topic
essentially went dormant for several decades. This is not surprising
given the limited reach of arbitration clauses in mid-century America.
Mandatory arbitration clauses were not generally found in consumer
contracts, and statutory claims were excluded from arbitration.124 It
would make little sense to commit a per se violation of the Sherman
Act by conspiring to collectively impose contract terms that were
likely unenforceable.

120. Cf. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting per se rule
applies to agreements that “because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable” (emphasis added)).
121. Arguably, they are not defensible when they are laden with anti-consumer
provisions imposed on customers through contracts of adhesion.
122. If such clauses are as useful or valuable as their proponents claim, firms could
introduce them—and consumers would accept them—without the need for a conspiracy.
123. Even if conspiracies to arbitrate do not qualify for per se illegality or quick-look
condemnation, courts should still find them unreasonable under the rule of reason. Rivals
in a market are expected to compete on both contract terms and the more traditional
areas of antitrust concern—price, quality, and service. Whenever sellers agree to impose
similar terms on their customers, regardless of whether those terms affect price or other
aspects of the contractual relationship, the sellers injure competition and potentially
violate antitrust law. In condemning the conspiracy to arbitrate among movie distributors,
the Supreme Court in Paramount Famous Lasky stated, “to establish violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, it is not necessary to show that the challenged arrangement
suppresses all competition between the parties or that the parties themselves are
discontented with the arrangement.” 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930). Thus, the members of an
arbitration conspiracy may continue to compete in terms of price, quality, and service, but
that does not save a horizontal agreement to impose arbitration clauses. Agreements
among rivals to impose arbitration clauses on their customers necessarily restrain
competition, and they are not excused by a legitimate business justification. While
defendants may proffer the alleged benefits of arbitration—speed, efficiency, and
informality—as their legitimate business justification, courts should reject any such
defense; it is the agreement among rivals—not the arbitration clause itself—that requires a
justification. Competitors have no legitimate reason to conspire to impose these anticonsumer terms in their contracts. Thus, the traditional rule of reason is a longer road, but
it leads to the same destination: illegality of conspiracies to arbitrate.
124. See supra Section I.A.
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The Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence of late, however,
has fundamentally changed the reach and value of arbitration clauses
to businesses intent on breaking the law. Businesses can now force all
manner of disputes—contractual, statutory, and constitutional—into
arbitration, denying consumers access to courts. Exacerbating the
problem, these businesses can then make arbitration infeasible
through class-action waivers. The Supreme Court’s re-imagination of
the purpose and reach of the FAA has made conspiracies to arbitrate
potentially irresistible.125 Because businesses can now use arbitration
clauses to block consumer access to courts, the following Sections
discuss how conspiracies to arbitrate have become rational in a way
that they were not in the first half century after Paramount Famous
Lasky was decided.
B.

Conspiracy to Arbitrate as a Primary Conspiracy

A conspiracy to arbitrate can be either a primary conspiracy or a
secondary conspiracy. In a primary conspiracy to arbitrate, the
manufacturers have no underlying or pre-existing illegal conspiracy.
They have not agreed to fix prices or allocate customers. They have
conspired only to impose arbitration clauses. As presented by the
Court, the agreement condemned in Paramount Famous Lasky
represented a primary conspiracy to arbitrate.126
A primary conspiracy to arbitrate can involve two distinct sets of
agreements. First, rivals could agree only that every firm in a market
will impose mandatory arbitration clauses on their customers. Second,
firms could conspire with respect to the terms in their arbitration
clauses. For example, the distributors in Paramount Famous Lasky
colluded to impose a multilateral enforcement mechanism for their
identically worded arbitration provisions.127 More importantly, today,
in the wake of Concepcion and Italian Colors, rival firms might agree
that all of their arbitration clauses will include class-action waivers.
This collusion would make individual arbitration so uneconomical
that victims of clear legal offenses may find it pointless to bring suit. If
the class-action waivers are not sufficient to prevent individual
plaintiffs from pursuing arbitration, rivals could also agree to include
specific terms in their arbitration clauses that preclude injunctive

125. See supra notes 25–45 and accompanying text.
126. See 282 U.S. at 37–41.
127. Id. at 40–41.
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relief, prevent pro-plaintiff fee shifting, limit damages, and shorten
the statute of limitations.128
1. The Motive to Conspire to Arbitrate
The firms in a market are collectively better off if every firm
imposes an arbitration clause on its customers. From an economic
perspective, most firms would prefer to force their customers into
mandatory arbitration—especially if doing so would allow the firms to
eliminate class actions, cap damages, limit discovery, and truncate the
statutes of limitation. Even if firms in the same market compete on
price and product quality, they may share a communal incentive to
impose arbitration agreements on all of their customers.
A firm may want the protection of an arbitration clause but
worry that imposing such a clause unilaterally will cause consumers to
shift to another supplier that does not impose mandatory
arbitration.129 For example, deposition testimony from an attorney at
Citigroup in one conspiracy-to-arbitrate case “reveal[ed] that [the]
Defendants may have been concerned that consumers would cancel
their cards if Citigroup unilaterally adopted an arbitration clause.”130
All firms benefit if they act in unison regarding arbitration clauses.
That way, each firm imposing an anti-consumer arbitration clause is
less likely to lose sales to a rival.131 If all the firms agree, then
consumers cannot escape mandatory arbitration.132
128. See, e.g., Second Consolidated and Am. Class Action Compl. at 3, In re Universal
Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., MDL No. 1468, 2003 WL 24047518 (D. Kan. Feb.
20, 2009) (alleging, in an antitrust case, that defendants conspired to impose arbitration
clauses that limited discovery, banned class actions, waived punitive damages, shortened
statute of limitations, and required “in some instances, [plaintiffs to] pay defendants’
attorneys’ fees if a motion to compel arbitration is granted”). Conspirators may agree to
use similar language that is incomprehensible to most consumers. The language of
arbitration clauses is generally more complex than other language in the same contract,
which makes it harder for consumers to appreciate the legal significance of an arbitration
clause. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, § 2.4, at 28. If conspirators
conspire to use opaque language in their arbitration clauses, they may be able to make
such clauses less salient. See infra notes 133–44.
129. See Mark R. Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition
and Contract Implications, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327, 410–11 (2010) (“The imposition
of unfair or burdensome terms by multiple sellers suggests that any of those sellers could
attract buyers by not imposing those terms . . . .”).
130. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., Nos. M 21–95, 05 Civ.
7116(WHP), 2012 WL 401113, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2012).
131. Additionally, the terms in standardized contracts, such as the inclusion and
substance of arbitration clauses, can be “sticky”—a term that scholars use to describe the
inertia that can delay firms from changing their contract terms. See Peter B. Rutledge &
Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses
After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 959 (2014). Contract “stickiness” can
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One could argue that arbitration conspiracies are unnecessary
because arbitration clauses are not salient to consumers.133 According
to this line of thinking, consumers do not read their contracts and are
generally unaware of the presence and content of any arbitration
clauses within a contract. If that is true, then a firm might impose an
arbitration clause unilaterally—even though its rivals do not require
arbitration—and not lose sales because consumers are oblivious or
indifferent to arbitration clauses. In such markets, a conspiracy to
arbitrate may seem unnecessary.
This salience argument is not as persuasive as it might seem.
First, some evidence suggests that arbitration clauses are becoming
more salient to consumers.134 Mainstream media sources are more
extensively reporting about the downsides of arbitration clauses for
consumers.135 In addition, consumers’ rights groups are educating the
public about the consequences and drawbacks of mandatory
arbitration.136 These efforts are emboldening consumers to resist
publicized attempts to impose mandatory binding arbitration. For
example, when General Mills attempted to unilaterally impose
slow the adoption of arbitration clauses, see id. at 961–62, or modification of existing
arbitration clauses to include class-action waivers. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of
Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 192–93 (2015). A conspiracy to impose arbitration
clauses can help overcome this stickiness by making arbitration clauses with class-action
waivers the industry norm.
132. An individual firm could possibly conclude that it would be profitable to
unilaterally impose arbitration clauses on its customers because the savings in reduced
litigation and liability costs will exceed the value of sales lost to customers who decide to
purchase from another seller. This is ultimately an empirical question. Joining a conspiracy
to arbitrate, however, simplifies the calculation by allowing a firm to obtain the pro-seller
benefits of mandatory arbitration without losing sales to competitors that do not require
customers to accept arbitration clauses.
133. Salience refers to consumers’ awareness and concern about product or contract
attributes. Price is generally salient in that consumers care about it and are more likely to
purchase a lower-priced item than a similar, but higher-priced, item. On salience of terms
in consumer contracts, see OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 91–92 (2012); see also id. at 94
(“Industry sources also confirm the behavioral-economics prediction that issuers will
aggressively compete on salient price dimensions and recoup losses through non-salient
price dimensions.”).
134. Id. at 93–94; see Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“Plaintiffs point to some signs of incipient salience with respect to class-action-barring
arbitration, such as publicity following the Minnesota Attorney General’s action against
the NAF and negative publicity accompanying Wells Fargo’s introduction of class-actionbarring arbitration clauses for bank account holders.”).
135. See, e.g., Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 97, at 1 (reporting on banking,
credit card, and other industries’ usage of arbitration).
136. See, e.g., Arbitration, NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES,
http://www.naca.net/issues/forced-arbitration [https://perma.cc/C7RR-M3DC] (providing a
guide detailing arbitration and its negative aspects).
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arbitration clauses on their customers, consumers protested loudly,
and the company rescinded its policy.137 The imposition of mandatory
arbitration clauses is particularly likely to become salient when the
other salient features of the transactions, such as price and quality,
are identical across sellers.138
Second, absent a conspiracy to arbitrate, the free market process
could increase the salience of arbitration clauses.139 Firms should
compete on their contract terms,140 such as whether to impose
mandatory arbitration clauses and, if so, the terms of the arbitration.
In many markets, the terms of arbitration clauses vary, with some
being more consumer friendly than others.141 Competitive firms would
advertise their pro-consumer terms.142 Arbitration clauses would be
more salient if firms (that did not require arbitration) advertised the
137. Stephanie Strom, General Mills Amends New Legal Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/business/general-mills-amends-new-legalpolicies.html?mcubz=0 [http://perma.cc/F6NH-66L3]. Of course, it remains possible that in
other contexts, consumers may be aware of arbitration clauses but discount their
significance because consumers misjudge the likelihood of being in a dispute. Russell
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1234 (2003) (“A form term calling for arbitration of disputes in an
inconvenient state, for example, is likely to be non-salient to the vast majority of buyers
unless the type of contract in question commonly results in disputes.”).
138. Thus, the salience of mandatory arbitration increases in the wake of price-fixing
agreements. This encourages price fixers to enter a secondary conspiracy to arbitrate. See
infra Section II.C.
139. For example, for decades, safety was not salient in the automobile market. Lee
Iacocca, the former President of Ford, famously asserted that consumers do not care about
safety. Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013,
1044 n.127 (1991) (“[H]aving announced his belief that ‘safety doesn’t sell,’ Iacocca
authorized a set of criteria for the Pinto that included no reference to safety.”). But safety
did become salient and is now a major selling feature of automobiles. It’s a Safety
Marketplace, and Consumers are Buying, STATUS REPORT, (Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety,
Highway Loss Data Inst., Arlington, VA), Apr. 15, 2010, at 1 http://www.iihs.org/iihs/sr
/statusreport/article/45/4/1 [https://perma.cc/H7HJ-S426]. One reason may be Volvo’s
heavy comparative advertising on safety. See Gurjit Degun, Volvo Cars Looks to the
Future of Safety in Global Campaign, CAMPAIGN (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.campaignlive.com/article/volvo-cars-looks-future-safety-global-campaign/1383759
[https://perma.cc/N9KW-3QE4].
140. Patterson, supra note 129, at 333 (“But standardization among firms also
eliminates competition on the standardized terms, adding market power to bargaining
power and making it even less likely that the needs of all parties will be served.”); see also
Thomas Wilhelmsson, Cooperation and Competition Regarding Standard Contract Terms
in Consumer Contracts, 17 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 49, 49 (2006).
141. See Gilles, supra note 80, at 829.
142. See Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“Competitors often force obscure terms to salience in order to distinguish and market
their products. For example, Capital One’s ‘No Hassle Rewards’ campaign drew attention
to the fact that some of its competitors imposed conditions such as blackout dates that
made redeeming rewards like frequent flyer miles difficult.” (citations omitted)).
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problems with their competitors’ mandatory arbitration clauses.143 A
conspiracy to arbitrate reduces the probability of arbitration clauses
becoming salient because if all firms in a market agree to impose
similar anti-consumer arbitration clauses, then no firm has an
incentive to educate consumers in that market in order to get a
competitive advantage. Consequently, firms may be motivated to
conspire to arbitrate in order to prevent arbitration clauses from
becoming salient in a given market.144
2. Harms of a Primary Conspiracy to Arbitrate
The dangers of conspiracies to arbitrate are easily seen through
the lens of antitrust law. Private plaintiffs bringing a section 1 claim
under the Sherman Act must prove that they suffered antitrust injury,
which is injury caused by a decrease in competition.145 In consumerinitiated antitrust actions, increased price caused by collusion is the
traditional form of antitrust injury, but other harms beyond increased
price can also constitute antitrust injury.146 For example, an
agreement among competitors to reduce quality and only sell inferior
products inflicts antitrust injury.147 Some cases discuss conspiracies to
arbitrate as a form of group boycott in which the conspirators have
agreed to refuse to sell to customers who do not waive their right to
litigate.148
Primary conspiracies to arbitrate inflict antitrust injury because
consumer contracts with arbitration clauses—especially those that
include class-action waivers—are inferior products.149 In litigation

143. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 57.
144. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 431–32 (“Collusion can delay the rise to salience of product
features that would normally become salient under competitive conditions.”).
145. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); Louisa
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813 (E.D.
Ky. 1999).
146. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 482–83 (1982).
147. See Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 276 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating
that a deterioration in quality constitutes an anticompetitive effect).
148. See, e.g., Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A., 524 F.3d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The
second claim alleges that the banks participated in a group boycott by refusing to issue
cards to individuals who did not agree to arbitration, also in violation of Section 1.”).
149. Some might argue that the arbitration-burdened product is not inferior because it
may cost less, as sellers could pass savings on in the form of lower prices. This argument is
unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the competitive market would offer a mix of
products, such that consumers could decide whether to pay less in exchange for waiving
their right to litigate in court. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM:
PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 44
(July 2010), www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/KFR6VGZZ] (“For example, a consumer might be offered a ten percent interest rate without a
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where plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy to arbitrate among banks that
issue credit cards, one court explained that “[t]he mere existence of
the clauses[] diminishes the cards’ value by foreclosing the
opportunity for cardholders to go to court and address grievances
through class action litigation.”150 By agreeing to impose mandatory
arbitration, firms are agreeing not to compete on product quality.151
Thus, consumers are injured by their inability to purchase the
superior product.152
Conspiracies to arbitrate also injure competition by reducing
consumer choice. If all of the major players in a market require
mandatory arbitration, consumers have less, or no, ability to choose a
more consumer-friendly product.153 The Supreme Court has
condemned horizontal agreements that limit “consumer choice by
impeding the ‘ordinary give and take of the market place.’”154
Professor Robert Lande has persuasively explained that “choicecentered antitrust policy will support and lead to a more efficient
market, the lowest prices, the best product quality and variety, the
highest level of consumer surplus, and all the other benefits of a

mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause, or a nine and three-quarters percent rate with
such a clause.”).
Second, and more importantly, much evidence indicates that any savings enjoyed
by sellers is not passed on to consumers. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note
46, § 1.4.9, at 18 (“That ‘difference-in-differences’ analysis did not identify any statistically
significant evidence of an increase in prices among those companies that dropped their
arbitration clauses and thus increased their exposure to class action litigation risk.”); Amy
J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 660 (2008) (“My review of eleven major credit card companies’
[2007] contracts, for example, indicated that consumers do not necessarily enjoy lower
interest rates, or APRs, if they accept arbitration clauses.”).
Finally, when the conspiracy to arbitrate is secondary to a price-fixing conspiracy,
the sellers have already agreed not to bid the price down.
150. Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
151. See Ross, 524 F.3d at 224 (“[T]he alleged conspiracy to limit the cardholders to
cards that require arbitration of disputes also diminished the present value of the cards
offered to the cardholders. A card that limits the holder to arbitration is less valuable (all
other factors being equal) than a card that offers the holder a choice between court action
or arbitration.”).
152. How to quantify and monetize this injury could prove difficult. Malcolm A.
Hoffman, Proof of Damages in Private Litigation, 36 ANTITRUST L.J. 151, 154 (1967)
(discussing Momand v. Universal Film Exch., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948)).
153. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 434 (“It is undeniable that consumer choice was
reduced when the seven Issuing Banks—who collectively held between 79-87% of the
transaction volume and outstanding balances in the credit card market from 1999–2009—
each adopted a class-action-barring clause.”).
154. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (quoting National Soc’y of
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
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competitive economy.”155 Conspiracies to arbitrate prevent this
market mechanism from working. This reduction in choice represents
an injury to consumers.156 To the extent that conspiracies to arbitrate
reduce competition regarding contract terms, antitrust law views them
as harmful.157
C.

Conspiracy to Arbitrate as a Secondary Conspiracy

A secondary conspiracy to arbitrate is an additional conspiracy
beyond an initial antitrust conspiracy.158 One example is when firms
first agree to form a price-fixing cartel and then also agree that each
cartel member will impose mandatory arbitration clauses on its
customers. While it would seem that adding a second conspiracy may
increase the risk of being caught violating antitrust law, the second
conspiracy helps insulate the first conspiracy from liability. This
Section explains how, if rival firms are already fixing price, and thus
already committing a felony, it makes sense to enter a secondary
conspiracy—a conspiracy to arbitrate. Doing so will both limit the
potential exposure from and strengthen the underlying price-fixing
conspiracy.
1. Concealing an Underlying Conspiracy
An arbitration conspiracy may help conceal the existence of the
underlying price-fixing conspiracy by reducing pre-trial discovery. In
the context of antitrust litigation, discovery limitations will generally
favor defendants.159 If the defendants can stem the flow of documents,
they increase their probability of victory. As one court explained,
“the heart of any American antitrust case is the discovery of business

155. Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT.
L. REV. 503, 504 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
156. See Ross, 524 F.3d at 223 (“The cardholders have adequately alleged antitrust
injuries in fact . . . . The Complaint alleges that reduced choice and diminished quality in
credit services result directly from the banks’ illegal collusion to constrict the options
available to cardholders.”).
157. Discussing contract standardization more generally, Professor Mark Patterson
argues that “the absence of negative effects overall does not matter, because elimination
of competition on any term is an antitrust violation.” Patterson, supra note 129, at 409–10
(2010) (citing Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (per curiam)).
158. As with a primary conspiracy to arbitrate, a secondary conspiracy to arbitrate
could be as simple as agreeing to impose arbitration clauses on all consumers.
Alternatively, it could be more detailed and include agreements to standardize the terms
of arbitration clauses. These standardized terms could include class-action waivers, antiinjunction clauses, damage limitations, and shortened statutes of limitations.
159. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 15–16.
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documents. Without them, there is virtually no case.”160 Because
antitrust plaintiffs generally require more evidence than do antitrust
defendants, “discovery restrictions asymmetrically benefit antitrust
violators over their victims.”161 Arbitration generally provides
significantly less discovery than does traditional litigation.162
Consequently, price-fixing conspirators can stem the flow of
documents by both forcing antitrust plaintiffs into arbitration and
then drafting their uniform arbitration clauses to explicitly limit
discovery. By removing victims of price fixing from federal court and
constraining discovery in arbitration, a secondary conspiracy to
arbitrate allows price fixers to prevent antitrust plaintiffs from getting
the discovery they need to prove the existence of the underlying
price-fixing conspiracy. Thus, both conspiracies are less likely to be
discovered.
2. Undermining Pro-Plaintiff Aspects of Antitrust Law
Antitrust law contains several pro-plaintiff policies designed to
encourage private plaintiffs to pursue antitrust litigation. These
include automatic treble damages and attorneys’ fees for successful
plaintiffs, a relatively long statute of limitations, and the ability to
bring class-action litigation. Price-fixing conspirators may design their
arbitration clauses to undermine these pro-plaintiff aspects of
antitrust law. This Section explains how a secondary conspiracy to
arbitrate can dismantle the consumer protections in antitrust law’s
statutory design.
Treble Damages. Outside of some narrow statutory exceptions,
federal judges must triple a successful antitrust plaintiff’s damages;
jurists have no discretion.163 These mandatory treble damages serve
three related goals. First, trebling damages strengthens deterrence.164
Given the fact that antitrust conspiracies are clandestine and difficult
to detect and to successfully sue over,165 awarding mere single
damages would make price fixing net profitable.166 Second, treble
160. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
161. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 16.
162. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
163. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47 (1st Cir. 2006).
164. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635
(1985) (citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138–39 (1968)).
165. Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless
Agents, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1634 (2008); see also John Gibeaut, Antitrust
American Style, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2004, at 55, 56.
166. Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical
Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269, 1312 (2013);
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damages also better “compensate victims of antitrust violations for
their injuries,”167 especially in light of the fact that antitrust litigation
is often protracted.168 Third, treble damages “encourage private
enforcement of the anti-trust laws,”169 which is important because
antitrust law is public interest law.170 In sum, treble damages are a
critical feature of America’s antitrust regime.
Price-fixing cartels have a strong incentive to conspire to use
mandatory arbitration clauses to dismantle the antitrust treble
damage scheme. Many firms have attempted to use arbitration
clauses as a means to de-treble antitrust damages.171 It remains
unclear whether these efforts will succeed.172 The Supreme Court has
not ruled definitively on the issue,173 but the Court has held that it is
for the arbiter—not the federal judge—to decide whether an
ambiguous arbitration clause limits the mandatory trebling provision
of a governing statute.174 Lower courts have suggested that arbiters
possess the authority to strike or uphold a damage-limitation
provision in an arbitration clause.175 This would seem to confer upon
arbiters the power to de-treble antitrust damages, a prerogative
Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO
STATE L.J. 115, 134–36 (1993); Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to
Settlement in Antitrust Class Action Litigation, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1039 (2008) (“As
long as a firm enjoys a non-negligible chance of evading responsibility, violating antitrust
laws appears rational: if not caught, the firm secures illegal profits, and, if caught, it simply
returns the ill-gotten gains.”).
167. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
168. See, e.g., Richard Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. &
ECON. 365, 374–81 (1970) (discussing the protracted length of public and private antitrust
litigation); see also JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 532–33 (2001).
169. Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240, 1242–43 (5th Cir. 1974)
(citing Bruce’s Juices, Inc. v. Am. Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751–52 (1947)).
170. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 885, 885 (2012); see also Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241
(1987) (“Antitrust violations generally have a widespread impact on national markets as a
whole, and the antitrust treble-damages provision gives private parties an incentive to
bring civil suits that serve to advance the national interest in a competitive economy.”).
171. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 24–25 (citing examples).
172. Cf. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 46 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[U]nder federal
law, the remedies provided by the antitrust statute cannot be contractually waived.”);
James C. Justice Cos. v. Deere & Co., No. 5:06-cv-00287, 2008 WL 828923, at *4 (S.D. W.
Va. Mar. 27, 2008) (“[T]reble damages as provided for in the Sherman Act is a nonwaivable substantive right.”); Baker & Stabile, supra note 51, at 410 n.85 (“It is not clear
whether arbitration tribunals are obliged to award mandatory treble damages by virtue of
the Clayton Act.”).
173. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 47–48 (“There is no Supreme Court precedent that speaks
directly to the question of whether treble damages under federal antitrust law may be
waived by contract.”).
174. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 407 n.2 (2003).
175. See Larry’s United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083, 1085–86 (8th Cir. 2001).
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denied to federal judges.176 If price fixers can de-treble damages
through a secondary conspiracy to arbitrate, they can significantly
reduce the incentives for consumers to investigate and bring antitrust
claims and can dramatically increase the expected value of their
illegal price-fixing activities, which undermines deterrence. In
essence, price fixers can use a conspiracy to arbitrate to effectively
repeal the Sherman Act’s provision of mandatory treble damages.
Injunctive Relief. Price fixers may wish to use an arbitration
conspiracy to preclude any injunctions against their interests.
Antitrust courts can award successful plaintiffs injunctive relief177 to
achieve three goals: “(1) putting an end to illegal conduct, (2)
depriving violators of the benefits of their illegal conduct, and (3)
restoring competition in the marketplace.”178 Federal judges fashion
antitrust injunctions to eliminate the “lingering effects” of antitrust
violations.179 Injunctive relief is important in many antitrust cases,180
particularly when the plaintiff is trying to prevent anticompetitive
injury before it occurs.181
Through a conspiracy to arbitrate, antitrust violators may draft
arbitration clauses that deny arbiters the authority to grant injunctive
relief.182 If every firm in a market imposes an arbitration clause with
an anti-injunction provision, consumers may be unable to preserve
their right to seek injunctions. Then, antitrust violators will have
effectively immunized themselves against a potent remedy.
176. Robert Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072,
1079 (1969) (discussing antitrust law “provisions calling for mandatory treble damages and
attorney’s fees for the plaintiff” and noting that “[i]n the ordinary commercial arbitration,
neither of those statutory provisions would be binding on the arbitrator”); Eric James
Fuglsang, Comment, Arbitrability of Domestic Antitrust Disputes: Where Does the Law
Stand?, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 779, 815 (1997) (“Because arbitration is designed primarily to
reach a fair settlement or compromise between the parties, arbitrators are more likely to
award only actual damages rather than the statutorily mandated treble damages.”); see
also Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 25–27.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2012) (permitting both the government and private plaintiffs to
request injunctions to remedy antitrust violations).
178. Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1059 (6th Cir.
1984) (quoting In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 538 F.2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 1976)).
179. See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 366 (7th Cir. 1990).
180. See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 88 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (finding antitrust action qualified for class certification “[b]ecause the highly
significant injunctive relief sought here is as important as the damages claimed”).
181. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969) (stating
that injunctive relief “is characteristically available even though the plaintiff has not yet
suffered actual injury”).
182. James J. Calder et al., A New Alternative to Antitrust Litigation: Arbitration of
Antitrust Disputes, Spring 1989 ANTITRUST 18, 19–20 (“Parties to an arbitration generally
. . . can limit the remedies available to the arbitrator.”).

96 N.C. L. REV. 381 (2018)

416

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

Fee Shifting. Antitrust law provides for one-way fee shifting in
which the successful private plaintiff—but not the successful
defendant—is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.183 Like
the trebling of antitrust damages, courts are required to award
successful antitrust plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees.184 Federal courts
have explained that this pro-plaintiff, one-sided fee shifting “both
encourages ‘private prosecution of antitrust violations by insulating
plaintiffs’ treble damage recoveries from the expense of legal fees,’
and deters violation of the antitrust laws by requiring a losing
defendant to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees ‘as part of his penalty
for having violated the antitrust laws.’”185 Pro-plaintiff fee shifting is
particularly important in antitrust cases in which only injunctive relief
is sought because “without the shifting of attorneys’ fees, a plaintiff
with a deserving case would personally have to pay the very high
price of obtaining judicial enforcement of the law . . . . A prevailing
plaintiff should not have to bear such an expense.”186 Absent this feeshifting provision, plaintiffs in some cases may properly conclude that
the cost of pursuing meritorious antitrust litigation is not worth the
benefit.187 If so, antitrust violations become more profitable and, thus,
more likely.
By drafting their arbitration clauses to override antitrust law’s
pro-plaintiff, one-way fee-shifting requirement, antitrust defendants
may be able to nullify antitrust law’s fee-shifting mandate.188 Some
commentators have argued that arbiters are not compelled to follow
antitrust law’s statutory mandate of fee awards to a prevailing

183. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
184. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 261 (1975) (“Under
the antitrust laws, . . . allowance of attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff awarded treble damages is
mandatory.”).
185. Sciambra v. Graham News, 892 F.2d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted)
(first quoting Home Placement Serv. v. Providence Journal Co., 819 F.2d 1199, 1210 (1st
Cir. 1987); then quoting Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg., 421 F.2d 61, 91 (1st
Cir. 1970)).
186. F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 203, 205 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-499, at 19 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2589).
187. Donald I. Baker, Revisiting History—What Have We Learned About Private
Antitrust Enforcement That We Would Recommend to Others?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 379, 386 (2004) (“[T]he one-way cost rule seems most important in equity cases
under Section 16 of the Clayton Act. The fact that such a plaintiff can recover costs is
definitely an incentive to seek an injunction.”); Lemley & Leslie, supra note 42, at 31.
188. For example, some arbitration clauses replace one-way fee-shifting with a twoway provision that requires the unsuccessful antitrust plaintiff to pay the defendants’ costs.
See, e.g., In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 700 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir.
2012).
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plaintiff.189 And some courts have upheld arbitration clauses that
preclude an arbiter from awarding attorneys’ fees to a successful
antitrust plaintiff.190 By conspiring to impose arbitration clauses that
prohibit pro-plaintiff fee shifting, antitrust defendants can reduce the
amount of their exposure and reduce the incentive for antitrust
plaintiffs to bring claims at all. This conspiracy to arbitrate
strengthens the underlying price-fixing conspiracy.
Statute of Limitations. Antitrust law has a four-year statute of
limitations.191 Many firms have attempted to shorten this limitations
period through arbitration clauses.192 Because of the judicial
deference to both arbitration provisions and their terms, federal
judges have allowed antitrust defendants to use these clauses to
truncate the four-year statute of limitations to one or two years.193 As
a matter of law, this is a mistake.194
By using a secondary arbitration conspiracy to truncate the
statute of limitations, price fixers can protect their primary conspiracy
to fix prices. First, a truncated statute of limitations gives antitrust
plaintiffs less time to unearth a sufficient amount of compelling
evidence to survive preliminary motions and to prove their cases to
the arbiter.195 Second, by manipulating the statute of limitations, firms
can reduce the plaintiff’s available damages. In general, a plaintiff
who could recover for four years of cartel overcharges in court will
only be able to recover for one year of cartel overcharges in
arbitration if the defendant has inserted a one-year limitations period

189. See Baker & Stabile, supra note 51, at 428 (suggesting that “the arbitrator might
be given broad discretion to allocate fees and costs”).
190. See, e.g., James C. Justice Cos. v. Deere & Co., No. 5:06-cv-00287, 2008 WL
828923, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 27, 2008) (“Court cannot conclude that the Dealership
Agreement’s limitation on attorney’s fees and costs is inconsistent with the policies of the
Sherman Act.”).
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2012).
192. See, e.g., In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 287 (4th Cir. 2007);
Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2006).
193. Buffon & Wolson, supra note 51, at 35 (“Thus, an arbitration agreement that
requires the parties to file their claim within one year after becoming aware of a claim has
been held enforceable, even when the statute of limitations period would otherwise be
longer.” (citing Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815, 826–27 (S.D. Ohio
1999))); see, e.g., James C. Justice, 2008 WL 828923, at *5.
194. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 33–34 (condemning the argument that antitrust
law’s four-year statute of limitations is procedural, not substantive, and therefore subject
to contractual shortening).
195. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007) (requiring antitrust
plantiffs to gather facts beyond “an allegation of parallel conduct, and a bare assertion of
conspiracy” to survive a motion to dismiss). Arbitrators, too, can grant dispositive “pretrial” motions.
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in the parties’ arbitration clause.196 This effectively slashes damages
by three-quarters, which undercuts both the compensatory and
deterrent functions of antitrust law.197
Class-Action Waivers. Class-action litigation is often necessary to
remedy antitrust violations. Given the number of victims, and thus
potential plaintiffs, of an antitrust conspiracy, “a class action is not
only the most efficient and convenient method to resolve this
controversy[;] it is the only ‘fair’ and ‘efficient’ means to adjudicate
this controversy.”198 In many cases, no plaintiff is likely to have
suffered sufficient injury to make initiating individual action costeffective.199 Because individual victims of antitrust violations do not
sue, compensation is denied. And because price fixers retain their
illegal profits, deterrence is extinguished.200
The members of a price-fixing conspiracy can exempt themselves
from class litigation by agreeing that each cartel member will impose
an arbitration clause that includes a class-action waiver. If the
expected costs exceed the maximum recovery, as in Italian Colors,
then no individual victim of the cartel will have sufficient financial
incentives to sue any member of the conspiracy.201 As a result,
through the collusive use of class-action waivers in arbitration clauses,
price fixers may effectively immunize themselves from private
antitrust liability altogether.
Summary. Although a firm could unilaterally insert the above
anti-consumer terms into its arbitration clauses, it may make more
sense for firms in a price-fixing conspiracy to collude to impose
arbitration clauses with standardized anti-consumer terms. Similar to
the dynamics of a primary conspiracy to arbitrate, a firm does not
want to be the only one to impose anti-consumer terms in its
196. In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d at 299–300 (Johnston, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“[W]hile the Antitrust Act effectively requires a four year
look-back period, the contract at issue would only allow the arbitrator to consider one
year of anti-competitive behavior.”).
197. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 34–35.
198. In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 527 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
199. See id. at 527 (“Moreover, although a large number of individuals may have been
injured, no one person may have been damaged to a degree which would induce him to
institute litigation solely on his own behalf.” (citing Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 296
(2d Cir. 1968))).
200. Cf. Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 725 (2012) (“If we allow companies to insulate
themselves from class actions, we are effectively allowing companies to escape many legal
regulations and thereby eliminating a great deterrent to company misconduct.”).
201. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
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contracts.202 The conspiracy to arbitrate eliminates each firm’s fear of
being a first mover. If every firm requires similar anti-consumer
terms, no firm will lose business to a more pro-consumer rival. More
importantly, if every cartel member imposes the same de-trebling,
anti-injunction, anti-fee-shifting, and reduced statute of limitations
provisions, along with class-action waivers, then the entire cartel is
protected—the antitrust violators will have effectively rewritten the
antitrust statutes.
3. Alleviating Settlement Pressure
A secondary conspiracy to arbitrate also relieves the pressure to
settle price-fixing litigation. Each individual firm in a price-fixing
conspiracy risks significant antitrust damages in litigation. Antitrust
law provides for joint and several liability,203 which makes every
participant in an illegal cartel liable for the overcharges of its cartel
partners.204 A consumer who pays an illegally elevated cartel price can
choose whom to sue: the firm from which it purchased the product,
another cartel member, or all of the cartel members.205 Because
antitrust damages are automatically trebled, the victims of a pricefixing conspiracy can sue a single cartel member for three times the
value of the entire cartel’s overcharges. Furthermore, antitrust law
denies defendants any right to contribution.206 Thus, a price-fixing
firm could be sued for treble the amount of all cartel profits and yet
be unable to recover anything from its co-conspirators.207
This joint and several liability—without a right to contribution—
creates a dynamic that favors antitrust plaintiffs. Although bringing
an antitrust lawsuit requires significant outlays, antitrust plaintiffs
may be able to use early settlements to secure their funding from the
defendants themselves. In price-fixing cases against multiple cartel
202. This is particularly true in a market marked by price fixing; when firms are all
charging the same price, non-price terms may become more salient to consumers. With
price removed as a variable for consumer decision-making, customers may be more likely
to focus on, and purchase from, the firm that does not impose mandatory arbitration or
does not load its arbitration clause with other remedy-reducing provisions.
203. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 904 n.15 (5th
Cir. 1979).
204. Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 982 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (E.D. Va.
1997).
205. Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1963) (“A
plaintiff need not sue all conspirators; he may choose to sue but one.”).
206. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981).
207. Edward D. Cavanagh, Contribution, Claim Reduction, and Individual Treble
Damage Responsibility: Which Path to Reform of Antitrust Remedies?, 40 VAND. L. REV.
1277, 1284 (1987).
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members, each defendant has an incentive to settle early because the
initial settlers can generally buy repose relatively cheaply. Antitrust
plaintiffs may find it rational to allow a defendant to exit the litigation
in exchange for a modest amount of money and admissible evidence
against the remaining defendants. The plaintiff knows that it can still
recover all of its damages from the as-of-yet non-settling defendants
because of antitrust law’s joint and several liability, and early
settlements give the plaintiff more evidence and more leverage
against the remaining defendants.208 Consequently, later-settling
antitrust defendants often pay relatively more than early-settling
defendants,209 which increases the ex ante pressure to settle early and
to sell out one’s cartel partners by supplying evidence to the plaintiffs.
Antitrust plaintiffs may seize on this dynamic by announcing that
later settlements will have “progressively higher rates” and may make
this threat credible by including most-favored-nation clauses in all
settlement agreements.210 This tactic ensures the later-settling
defendants cannot receive more favorable settlement terms than the
earlier-settling defendants. Because the non-settling defendants face
relatively higher exposure and the plaintiffs’ case against them grows
stronger as the plaintiffs acquire additional evidence from each
settling defendant,211 antitrust defendants “may compete against each
208. Christopher R. Leslie, Judgment-Sharing Agreements, 58 DUKE L.J. 747, 777
(2009).
209. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897,
MDL 997, 1995 WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (“The plaintiffs ‘take small
amounts . . . at the beginning of the settlement process’ and larger amounts as time
progresses.” (quoting Senate testimony of Stephen D. Susman)); Cavanagh, supra note
207, at 1288 n.67 (providing settlement figures in corrugated container litigation indicating
that defendants who settled later paid more); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation:
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of H. Comm. on
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 37–38 (1982) [hereinafter Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings]
(statement of Denis McInerney, Esquire, Cahill, Gordon & Reindel) (“Consequently, it
has become commonplace for late-settling defendants to be forced to contribute to
settlements in amounts wholly disproportionate to their percentage of the questioned sales
. . . .”).
210. Leslie, supra note 208, at 758; see A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH
NO. 11, CONTRIBUTION AND CLAIM REDUCTION IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION 15–16
(1986) (“In fact, the plaintiffs openly announced that each settlement in the case would be
at progressively higher rates, and each settlement agreement contained a ‘most favored
nation clause’ that assured that succeeding settlements would be no more favorable.”); see
also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 209, at 37–38 (statement of Denis
McInerney, Esquire, Cahill, Gordon & Reindel).
211. John Cirace, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Contribution and Claim Reduction in
Antitrust Treble Damage Suits, 55 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 42, 45 (1980) (“In general, whenever
a defendant settles with the plaintiff for a sum less than three times the damages
attributable to its acts, each remaining defendant faces an increased risk that it will be
forced to bear more than its proportionate share of the damages.”).
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other to reach an early settlement so as not to be one of the last
remaining defendants who pays a disproportionately large share of
the damages.”212 Many antitrust defendants try to alleviate this
settlement pressure by contracting with each other.213
Conspiracies to arbitrate provide a mechanism for price-fixers to
reduce the pressure to settle by staying out of federal court
altogether. By forcing their victims into arbitration, price fixers may
not have to enter settlements at all because no individual victim may
find it financially feasible to pursue arbitration.214 This strategy
diminishes an antitrust defendant’s incentive to trade evidence of
price-fixing in exchange for an early settlement. However, in order to
avoid federal court and the subsequent settlement pressure, it is
insufficient for an individual price-fixing firm to impose mandatory
arbitration clauses only on its own customers. Because of antitrust
law’s joint and several liability, that price-fixing firm could be sued by
its co-conspirators’ customers as well. Thus, each cartel member
needs all of its co-conspirators to impose similar arbitration clauses
on their customers, too. If one firm in the cartel does not impose
mandatory arbitration, then that firm’s customers could sue any and
all members of the cartel for treble damages, and those antitrust
defendants will have an incentive to expose the cartel in exchange for
a relatively small settlement payment. A conspiracy to arbitrate can
reduce defendants’ rush to settle antitrust litigation by ensuring that
all victims of the price-fixing conspiracy are denied access to courts.
This secondary conspiracy eliminates the pressure to settle, and,
consequently, protects the cartel.

212. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 210, at 15 (“Thus, a competition
develops among defendants to settle early in the case, when plaintiffs need money and
settlements are cheap, which reduces the pool of remaining defendants and thereby
further fuels the impetus to settle quickly.”); see WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G.
ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 29 (1986) (noting
“great pressure on a defendant to settle early so as not to be exposed to the lion’s share of
the joint trebled damages”); Yosef J. Riemer, Note, Sharing Agreements Among
Defendants in Antitrust Cases, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 293–94 (1984).
213. Leslie, supra note 208, at 758–64 (detailing how price-fixing defendants have
sought to mitigate the pressure to settle by entering into judgment-sharing agreements,
contracts by which antitrust co-defendants agree in advance what their relative
responsibility will be for antitrust damages attributed to their cartel activity).
214. Including a class-action waiver in these collusive arbitration clauses that prevents
class-wide arbitration can make arbitration prohibitively expensive for individual plaintiffs
and, thus, no member of the price-fixing conspiracy will be held accountable.
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4. Adding a Net Beneficial, Relatively Minor Conspiracy
Given all of the complicated components of a price-fixing
arrangement, the addition of a conspiracy to arbitrate is relatively
minor. Price fixing is more complicated than simply setting a single
fixed price and then collecting cartel profits. Cartel members will
often have different profit-maximizing prices.215 For example, firms
may have different cost structures, and more efficient firms may
maximize profits at a lower cartel price than firms with higher costs.216
Even firms with similar cost structures may disagree about what price
to charge, as some risk-averse firms may worry that setting price too
high would attract entry into the market.217 Furthermore, many cartels
have to fix multiple prices, depending on the characteristics of the
customers or the product lines involved.218
In addition to price considerations, many cartels limit the output,
sales, and even working hours of their member firms.219 Cartels that
limit total production must then negotiate each firm’s individual
market share.220 Moreover, all of the above agreements need to be
renegotiated continually as the market conditions change.221
Compared to other aspects of cartelization, a secondary
conspiracy to arbitrate is relatively simple. The parties are unlikely to
have different profit-maximizing arbitration terms. They all benefit
from mandatory arbitration provisions and from class-action waivers,
as well as from limiting discovery, shortening statutes of limitations,
banning injunctive relief, and eliminating pro-plaintiff fee shifting.
Furthermore, the conspirators need not meet regularly in order to
renegotiate the arbitration clause terms among themselves. Once they

215. Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64
VAND. L. REV. 813, 826 (2011).
216. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §4.1, at 193–94 (5th ed. 2016); see also James M.
Griffin, Previous Cartel Experience: Any Lessons For OPEC?, in ECONOMICS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE: AN ECLECTIC APPROACH 179 (Lawrence R. Klein & Jaime Marquez
eds., 1989).
217. This is essentially limit pricing.
218. Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 215, at 827–28; see Joseph E. Harrington, How
Do Cartels Operate?, 2 FOUND. & TRENDS MICROECONOMICS 1, 14–16 (2006) (discussing
citric acid and plasterboard cartels).
219. See, e.g., SIMON N. WHITNEY, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL
CONTROL 70–71 (1934) (discussing the cotton cartel and noting that Cotton-Textile
Institute capped its members’ workweek to fifty-five hours per week for day shifts and
fifty for night shifts).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing
volume allocation in the lysine cartel).
221. Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 215, at 833–34.
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have each imposed their arbitration clauses, they need not discuss the
issue again.222 As a result, the conspiracy-to-arbitrate component of a
larger price-fixing conspiracy has a relatively high incremental benefit
but a relatively low incremental cost.
5. Summary
Private enforcement of antitrust laws is designed to deter and
punish cartel behavior. Price fixers, however, would like to prevent
these private actions. In order to reduce the risk of antitrust liability,
conspirators would like to preclude their victims from suing in federal
court, to eliminate treble damages, to reduce the time window for
which damages are recoverable, and to prevent injunctive relief.
Antitrust conspirators may be able to achieve these goals through
industry-wide mandatory arbitration. Especially in the wake of Italian
Colors,223 a conspiracy to arbitrate may allow price-fixing firms to
prevent class-action litigation and class-wide arbitration, to make the
expected cost of individual arbitration exceed its benefits, and, thus,
to essentially agree to eliminate private antitrust lawsuits against
members of the conspiracy. Given all of these benefits, it should
constitute cartel malpractice not to include a secondary conspiracy to
arbitrate.224
III. JUDICIAL FACILITATION OF CONSPIRACIES TO ARBITRATE
Because conspiracies to arbitrate can inflict significant
anticompetitive harm—and are per se illegal—the legal system should
be designed to detect and to penalize such conspiracies. Courts,
however, have constructed a legal regime that effectively protects
conspiracies to arbitrate. This Part explains how courts have
incentivized conspiracies to arbitrate, even while acknowledging that
such agreements violate antitrust law.

222. See infra note 311–12 and accompanying text (discussing example of an
“arbitration coalition” of rival banks disbanding after all of the firms imposed arbitration
agreements on their customers).
223. Before Italian Colors, some courts had applied the Effective Vindication Doctrine
to hold antitrust claims to be not subject to arbitration. See, e.g., In re Elec. Books
Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2293 (DLC), 2012 WL 2478462, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2012)
(holding arbitration agreements to be “invalid as to plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims because
the plaintiffs have established that the agreements would prevent them from effectively
vindicating their rights under the Sherman Act”).
224. Cf. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124
YALE L.J. 3052, 3081 (2015) (“Indeed, after Italian Colors, it would be irrational for legal
advisors not to insulate their corporate clients from private enforcement of substantive
laws in the ways permitted under the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence.”).
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A. Supreme Court Arbitration Jurisprudence as the Catalyst for
Conspiracies to Arbitrate
In the half-century following the Supreme Court’s condemnation
of conspiracies to arbitrate in Paramount Famous Lasky in 1930, such
collusion does not seem to have been a recurring problem. One
explanation is that competitors did not conspire to impose arbitration
clauses on their customers because the Court had rendered such
agreements among competitors illegal. This law-abidance explanation
is contradicted by the fact that competitors continued to fix prices
after the Supreme Court held that price-fixing conspiracies were per
se illegal.225 The lack of conspiracies to arbitrate is probably a
function of the limited reach of arbitration clauses until the 1980s.
Although the FAA made arbitration agreements between merchants
enforceable,226 Congress did not intend the FAA to apply to
consumer contracts, especially contracts of adhesion, or to federal
statutory claims, like antitrust.227 Because arbitration clauses were not
the pro-business devices that they have become, firms had little
incentive to insert arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts
either unilaterally or conspiratorially.
The Supreme Court set the stage for conspiracies to arbitrate in
the mid-1980s when it—incorrectly—asserted that the FAA
embodied a federal policy favoring the enforcement of all manner of
mandatory arbitration provisions.228 The Supreme Court’s incorrect
claim of a congressional policy favoring arbitration makes primary
conspiracies to arbitrate rational. Its pro-arbitration decisions created
the legal environment necessary for arbitration conspiracies to thrive.
Until consumer claims were subject to arbitration, firms had no
incentive to unilaterally insert mandatory arbitration provisions in
their consumer contracts. Similarly, they had no incentive to collude
to impose such terms.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence
made secondary conspiracies to arbitrate irresistible. When the
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.229 Court

225. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940) (finding a
price-fixing scheme existed in the midwestern oil market).
226. Arbitration Hearings, supra note 17, at 10 (statement of W. H. H. Piatt, Chairman
of the Comm. of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, ABA) (providing that the FAA
was designed for disputes involving “a contract between merchants one with another,
buying and selling goods” (emphasis added)).
227. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
229. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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held that antitrust claims were arbitrable, it never considered how
such a rule would affect consumers who sought to recover for being
overcharged by a cartel.230 A legal rule that allows price-fixing claims
to be channeled into arbitration rewards price fixers who include
arbitration clauses in their contracts with customers.231 If antitrust
claims were not arbitrable, price fixers would have no reason to enter
a secondary conspiracy to arbitrate. Price fixers would be unable to
use arbitration clauses as a mechanism to de-treble damages, prevent
injunctions, shorten statutes of limitation, or preclude class actions.
In sum, conspiracies to arbitrate were not particularly profitable
until courts began enforcing arbitration clauses in consumer contracts
and subjecting statutory claims to mandatory arbitration. These
changes in arbitration jurisprudence incentivized competitors to
conspire to impose arbitration clauses on consumers. But for the
Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence, antitrust violators
would not be able to employ arbitration conspiracies to deny their
customers access to courts, to prevent class actions, and to undermine
the pro-plaintiff aspects of antitrust law.
B.

Judicial Enforcement of Conspiracies to Arbitrate

Antitrust conspiracies face two major challenges: maximizing the
likelihood of their agreement being enforced and minimizing the risk
of antitrust liability.232 Enforcement is important because if their
agreement goes unenforced, the colluding firms will not attain the
goals of their conspiracy. For example, because price-fixing
agreements are not enforceable in court, when cartels cannot perfect
a private enforcement mechanism, they are likely to be unstable and
collapse into competition.233 Still, even failed cartels violate antitrust
law, and if the conspirators are held liable, the antitrust damages
could be high. The prospect of trebled damages may deter many
would-be cartelists from conspiring with their competitors.234 In the
230. See id. at 617, 619–20 (dealing with antitrust claims based on alleged wrongful
termination of dealership).
231. See supra Section II.C.
232. Enforcement issues affect the expected benefits of conspiring while the
probability of antitrust liability goes to the expected costs of conspiring. If the latter
outweigh the former, then a rational firm would decline to collude.
233. See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 632–
34 (2004). The enforcement conundrum in traditional price-fixing conspiracies involves
the risk that cartel members will cheat on the cartel agreement by charging a lower price
(and/or selling more than their cartel allotment), and the non-cheating cartel members will
have no ability to enforce their price-fixing agreement and to punish the cheater.
234. This is especially true if the firms conclude that an unenforceable cartel agreement
is unlikely to generate significant long-term profits.
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context of conspiracies to arbitrate, the enforcement conundrum has
an additional facet; even if all of the conspiracy’s members abide by
their agreement and impose arbitration clauses on their customers,
the conspirators still need the cooperation of federal judges. If judges
do not enforce the conspiracy-instigated arbitration clauses, then the
conspiracy cannot achieve its goals.
Some courts have approached the issue of conspiracies to
arbitrate in a manner that solves this aspect of the conspirators’
enforcement problem. When customers suspect that they have signed
contracts with mandatory arbitration provisions that were the product
of a conspiracy among the sellers in the relevant market, they may file
an antitrust complaint in federal court. The antitrust defendants then
inevitably respond by moving to compel arbitration because forcing
their victims into arbitration was the whole point of conspiring to
impose arbitration clauses in the first place. If a federal court grants
the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, the judge is essentially
enforcing the underlying illegal conspiracy that the plaintiffs are
challenging.235
Even though a conspiracy to arbitrate cannot succeed without
federal judges serving as collaborators, some courts fail to recognize
that they are mere instrumentalities of an illegal cartel. As a result,
they compel the victims of an arbitration conspiracy to arbitrate their
conspiracy claims. For example, the Fifth Circuit has held that “[e]ven
if the district court were to find that such an antitrust conspiracy [to
impose arbitration clauses] existed, this finding would not compel the
invalidation of the agreement to arbitrate . . . .”236 Similarly, a
federal judge in Kansas held that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleging a
conspiracy to arbitrate could not be heard in federal court, but rather
had to be decided by an arbitrator.237 Both of these courts cited “the
FAA’s strong policy toward enforcing arbitration clauses” to hold
that “declaring the arbitration clauses unenforceable is not an
appropriate remedy” in litigation alleging an illegal conspiracy to

235. The goal of a conspiracy to arbitrate is to funnel all claims against the defendants
into private arbitration. Further, when the conspiracy to arbitrate is a secondary
conspiracy, price-fixing firms are seeking to prevent their victims from bringing pricefixing claims in federal court.
236. Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1155 (5th
Cir. 1992) (affirming district court order compelling arbitration).
237. In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., No. 02-MD-1468, 2003 WL
21254765, at *6 (D. Kan. May 27, 2003) (“In sum, the court rejects plaintiffs’ argument
that the arbitration clauses in this case are not enforceable because they are allegedly the
product of an antitrust conspiracy.”).
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arbitrate.238 This invocation of a supposed federal policy in favor of
arbitration is flawed because Congress embedded no such policy in
the FAA.239
In theory, federal law precludes judicial “enforcement of the
arbitration provision [if enforcement] would make the Court a party
to the unlawful activity” such as an antitrust violation.240 But this rule
is rendered meaningless when courts hold that an arbitrator gets to
decide whether an arbitration clause violates antitrust law.241 If
federal courts compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their conspiracy-toarbitrate claims, then the conspirators have already succeeded; the
purpose of the conspiracy was to force their customers into
arbitration.242 While it is true that plaintiffs could theoretically pursue
their antitrust claims in arbitration, by deferring to arbitration clauses
with class-action waivers, federal judges make it economically
infeasible for the victims of arbitration conspiracies to bring
individual claims.243
Even if individual plaintiffs did pursue their claims in arbitration,
the arbitration process is much more pro-defendant, which is one
reason why antitrust defendants conspire to impose arbitration
clauses in the first place. With limited discovery, antitrust plaintiffs
are less likely to secure incriminating evidence.244 Moreover, arbiters
may exhibit explicit or unconscious bias in favor of antitrust
defendants, who are more likely to be repeat players and thus hire the

238. Id. at *4; see Dillard, 961 F.2d at 1154–55.
239. See supra note 18.
240. Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 154 (D.D.C. 2004), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 1156 (2007) (“Under the FAA, however, a party is not relieved from an
agreement to arbitrate on the ground that the contract is allegedly void for violation of the
antitrust laws unless plaintiffs demonstrate that the Court’s enforcement of the arbitration
provision would make the Court a party to the unlawful activity.”); see also Dickstein v.
duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 786 (1st Cir. 1971) (“But antitrust defenses are allowed only in cases
where the intrinsic illegality of the contract is so clear that enforcement would make a
court party to the precise conduct forbidden by the law.”).
241. Jung, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 154 (deciding that on the issue of “whether a contract
violates the antitrust laws, federal law permits the arbitrator to make that determination”
(citing Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 721 (9th Cir. 1999); Coors Brewing Co. v.
Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1995))).
242. In some ways, this judicial error is reminiscent of the mistake that the Supreme
Court made in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967), in which the Court held that an arbitrator gets to decide whether the contract—
containing an arbitration clause—was itself procured by fraud. Id. at 399–400. Prima Paint
is widely considered to be wrongly decided and reasoned. See, e.g., Moses, supra note 18,
at 130.
243. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
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arbitrator again.245 Furthermore, antitrust defendants may load their
arbitration clauses with anti-consumer terms—such as limiting
discovery, shortening statutes of limitations, banning injunctive relief,
and eliminating pro-plaintiff fee shifting—that would be
unenforceable in federal court but may be enforced by an
arbitrator.246 All of these factors make it less likely that participants in
an actual conspiracy to arbitrate will be held liable in arbitration. In
sum, when federal judges send an arbitration conspiracy complaint to
arbitration, the conspirators are securing the very aims of the
conspiracy that federal judges are supposed to invalidate and punish.
C.

Judicial Misuse of Equitable Doctrines to Enforce Conspiracies to
Arbitrate

Courts sometimes employ equitable doctrines to compel
arbitration in ways that benefit antitrust conspirators. When antitrust
plaintiffs bring lawsuits alleging price-fixing conspiracies, some courts
invoke equitable principles to require plaintiffs to arbitrate claims
against even those defendants with whom the plaintiffs have no
contractual relationship. For example, in In re Titanium Dioxide
Antitrust Litigation,247 plaintiffs brought class-action litigation against
four defendants—DuPont, Huntsman, Kronos, and Millennium—for
conspiring to fix the price of titanium dioxide.248 The plaintiffs settled
with DuPont and Huntsman, the largest players in the market.249
Although neither Kronos nor Millennium were in contractual
relationships with most of the class members, these defendants
argued that those class members who had entered contracts with
DuPont or Huntsman that contained arbitration clauses could not sue
245. Pat K. Chew, Comparing the Effects of Judges’ Gender and Arbitrators’ Gender in
Sex Discrimination Cases and Why It Matters, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 195, 210
(2017) (“[E]mployers are repeat players who are likely to be more familiar with the
arbitration process, including the selection of the arbitrators.”); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E.
Fisch & A. C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 118 (2010)
(discussing study that “concluded that party control of selection results in the brokerage
firms, which are more likely to be repeat players, dominating the selection process and
producing panels more likely to contain arbitrators who tend to side with large brokerage
firms”); Lemley and Leslie, supra note 45, at 18–20 (describing how “repeat player bias
may infect the arbitration process”); Note, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Proposals for
Reform of Consumer-Defendant Arbitration, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1175 (2009) (“If a
party that is a repeat player is allowed to reject arbitrators or otherwise influence the
selection process, the arbitrator will have a strong incentive to find for the repeat player
consistently.”).
246. See supra Section I.B.2.
247. 962 F. Supp. 2d 840 (D. Md. 2013).
248. Id. at 844–45.
249. Id.
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Kronos and Millennium in court.250 Kronos and Millennium moved to
compel arbitration.251 The district court granted the motion, holding
that “the class members would be equitably estopped from avoiding
the arbitration clauses that they signed with DuPont and
Huntsman.”252 The court was unpersuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument
that this equitable estoppel “doctrine cannot apply when the
connection between [the antitrust defendants] is only their illegal
concerted activity.”253 Not only did the court reject the plaintiffs’
claims, the court accused the plaintiffs of being unscrupulous,
informing the plaintiffs that
[t]hey cannot rely on their contracts to assert this Sherman Act
claim, yet repudiate the clauses within those contracts that
preclude certain members from participating in this class action
litigation. To rule otherwise would in essence allow class
members to have their cake and eat it too—in other words, to
“rely on the contract when it works” to their advantage, while
“repudiating it” when it works to their disadvantage.254
The court misconstrued the plaintiffs’ case; the plaintiffs were in
no way trying to enforce any contracts against the remaining
defendants. The plaintiffs had no contractual relationship with
Kronos and Millennium at all.255 The plaintiffs, however, did not need
one because the plaintiffs had antitrust standing to recover from any
member of the price-fixing conspiracy.256
The court similarly applied “equitable reasons” to hold that the
forum selection clauses, jury waivers, and class-action waivers
250. Id. at 849.
251. Id. at 848.
252. Id. at 850.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 852 (quoting In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971, 976
(11th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom., PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003)).
To accuse the plaintiffs of “rely[ing] on the contract,” see id., is an odd characterization of
the plaintiffs’ claims. They were neither suing for breach nor trying to enforce the
contract; they were bringing a civil claim based on the defendants’ alleged criminal
conduct of price fixing.
255. Id. at 849 (“[A]lmost all of the arbitration clauses that Defendants Millennium
and Kronos seek to enforce derive from contracts formed between class members and
either DuPont or Huntsman. Indeed, the record reflects that there are only seven Kronos
contracts and seven Millennium contracts that contain arbitration clauses.”).
256. 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:8, at 106 (Alba Conte & Herbert. B.
Newberg eds., 4th ed. 2002) (“Where a conspiracy among several defendants is alleged,
such as in antitrust price-fixing conspiracies, it is settled that one coconspirator is liable for
all the damages inflicted by the conspiracy, and the plaintiff has standing to sue any or all
of the coconspirators whether or not the plaintiff has had any direct business dealings or
other relationship with a particular defendant.”).
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contained in the plaintiffs’ contracts with the signatory defendants
(who had settled) could also be enforced by the non-signatory
defendants.257 This is outrageous: a buyer who pays an illegally
inflated price for a product cannot sue the antitrust violator in court
because of that violator’s illicit relationship with another conspirator.
Such reasoning fails to appreciate that enforcing an arbitration
agreement with respect to non-signatories perpetuates the illegal
agreement. Despite this, the equitable estoppel for co-conspirators
appears to be the majority approach.258 Subsequently, courts in other
jurisdictions have followed the reasoning of Titanium Dioxide.259
Although the Titanium Dioxide litigation did not involve
allegations of a conspiracy to arbitrate, including such allegations
does not restore the plaintiffs’ right to sue in court. For example, in In
re Universal Service Fund Telephone Billing Practices Litigation,260
plaintiffs alleged an antitrust conspiracy among long-distance carriers,
including a conspiracy to impose arbitration clauses.261 The district
judge concluded that “notions of equity and fairness require the court
to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ antitrust claims against the long
distance carriers other than their own under the terms of those
plaintiffs’ arbitration clauses with their respective long distance
carriers.”262 Like the Titanium Dioxide opinion, the court here
asserted that because the plaintiffs had alleged “concerted
misconduct” among the antitrust defendants, the defendants could
take advantage of each other’s arbitration clauses.263 The Universal
Service Fund opinion gave substantial weight to the fact that the
plaintiffs had alleged a conspiracy to arbitrate, holding that equitable
estoppel principles allowed non-signatory defendants to compel
plaintiffs to arbitrate even though those defendants had no
contractual relation to the plaintiffs solely because “the arbitration
clauses at issue are a product of the alleged conspiratorial behavior
. . . .”264 The court accused the plaintiffs of trying “to rely on the
terms of their service contracts” to claim an antitrust conspiracy but
not “to be bound by the arbitration clauses in their service contracts
despite the fact that those service contracts are the basis for their
257. Titanium Dioxide, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 852.
258. Id. at 851 (citing cases supporting that approach).
259. See, e.g., Valspar Corp. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 15 F. Supp. 3d 928,
933–34 (D. Minn. 2014).
260. 300 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (D. Kan. 2003).
261. See id. at 1139.
262. Id. at 1140 (emphasis added).
263. See id. at 1139–40.
264. Id. at 1140 n.17.
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antitrust claims.”265 This characterization is inaccurate because the
plaintiffs were not trying to enforce the contracts. Instead, they
argued that the contracts provided evidence of an illegal conspiracy in
a statutory claim against a firm with which the plaintiffs had no
contract.
These cases illustrate how federal courts have become enforcers
of the alleged conspiracies that they are tasked with scrutinizing and,
if proven, punishing. For example, if the defendants in Universal
Service Fund did conspire to impose arbitration clauses as alleged,
then the court enforced the conspiracy by forcing the plaintiffs to
arbitrate their antitrust claims. The court implemented exactly what
the underlying conspirators had sought all along: to prevent their
customers from litigating their antitrust claims in court.266 Similarly,
by enforcing both the arbitration clauses and the collateral anticonsumer terms buried in those arbitration clauses, the Titanium
Dioxide opinion assured businesses that federal courts will enforce
multiple aspects of a secondary conspiracy to arbitrate.
How do courts justify using equitable doctrines to reach such
inequitable results? They invoke the Supreme Court’s manufactured
federal policy that reveres arbitration.267 Whether or not the plaintiffs’
antitrust case involves allegations of a conspiracy to impose
arbitration clauses, courts have used equitable estoppel to allow nonsignatory antitrust defendants to enforce their co-defendants’
arbitration clauses and have the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims removed
from federal court. In both scenarios, courts have relied upon the
pretended federal preference for arbitration. For example, the
Titanium Dioxide court reasoned that the plaintiffs were compelled to
arbitrate against the non-signatories because otherwise “the federal
policy in favor of arbitration [would be] effectively thwarted.”268
Similarly, the Universal Service Fund court worried that if it did not
allow the non-signatories to “compel arbitration of all of the
plaintiffs’ claims under the terms of the respective arbitration clauses,

265. Id. at 1140 (“Plaintiffs are essentially attempting to ‘have it both ways.’”).
266. The misuse of equitable estoppel against plaintiffs seeking to avoid arbitration is
not unique to antitrust jurisprudence but rather resides in arbitration law more broadly, as
courts treat conspiracy allegations as the hook that allows non-signatories to force the
alleged conspiracy’s victims into arbitration. See, e.g., Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co.,
675 F.3d 355, 373 (4th Cir. 2012); Autonation Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Arain, 592 S.E.2d 96, 101
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing In re Humana, Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971
(11th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom., PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003)).
267. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
268. In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 962 F. Supp. 2d 840, 850 (D. Md. 2013)
(quoting MS Dealer Serv. Corp v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999)).
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the arbitration proceedings between the signatories to the service
contracts . . . will ‘be rendered meaningless and the federal policy in
favor of arbitration effectively thwarted.’”269 As explained previously,
the courts’ reasoning in these cases is troubling for three reasons.
First, although courts claim that they would not compel arbitration in
a manner that would effectuate antitrust conspiracies,270 the above
decisions result in federal judges enforcing the very conspiracies to
arbitrate that the plaintiffs are challenging.271 Second, there is nothing
equitable about a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement being
able to force the victim of an alleged conspiracy to arbitrate into
arbitration.272 Third, these opinions are based on a false premise
because Congress never enacted a federal policy in favor of
arbitration.273
In sum, courts apply equitable doctrines in a manner that creates
inequitable results. In the context of antitrust conspiracies, judges
should exercise their discretion to protect the victims of illegal
conspiracies, not the perpetrators.

269. Universal Serv. Fund, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (quoting Sam Reisfeld & Son Imp.
Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1976)).
270. Cf. Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 783 (7th Cir. 1994)
(stating that an arbitration clause may be enforceable in an antitrust case “[e]specially . . .
where . . . there is no suggestion that the party resisting invocation of the clause was
coerced into accepting it or that the arbitrators are themselves a cat’s paw of the cartel”);
Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 786 (1st Cir. 1971) (allowing antitrust defenses to
arbitration “only in cases where the intrinsic illegality of the contract is so clear that
enforcement would make a court party to the precise conduct forbidden by the law”);
Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 153–54 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Under the
FAA . . . a party is not relieved from an agreement to arbitrate on the ground that the
contract is allegedly void for violation of the antitrust laws unless plaintiffs demonstrate
that the Court’s enforcement of the arbitration provision would make the Court a party to
the unlawful activity.”).
271. In theory, an arbitrator could decide whether a particular arbitration is
inappropriate because it is the product of an illegal conspiracy. Such an approach is
nonsensical; the plaintiffs’ argument is that they should not be in arbitration at all. Such a
misstep is similar to the Supreme Court’s flawed opinions holding that arbitrators, not
courts, should determine the legality of contracts with arbitration clauses. See Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006).
272. See Frank Z. LaForge, Inequitable Estoppel: Arbitrating with Nonsignatory
Defendants Under Grigson v. Creative Artists, 84 TEX. L. REV. 225, 241 (2005) (“[E]quity
is not offended by the nonenforcement of an arbitration clause by a nonsignatory against a
signatory.”).
273. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
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D. Giving Retroactive Effect to Arbitration Clauses in Antitrust
Disputes
A secondary conspiracy to arbitrate may become particularly
attractive if price-fixing firms suspect that their cartel has been, or is
about to be, detected by its victims. Price-fixing firms that have not
already burdened their customers with mandatory arbitration clauses
may rationally fear being sued in federal court for violating section 1
of the Sherman Act. But price-fixing conspirators can prevent
themselves from being hauled into court by imposing retroactive
arbitration clauses before their victims file suit. At the first sign of
trouble, price fixers can amend their consumer contracts to force
arbitration of antitrust violations that the firms have already
committed.274
Courts in antitrust cases have held that companies can impose
arbitration clauses requiring that all claims—including those arising
before the insertion of the arbitration clause into the consumer
contract—must be arbitrated, so long as the arbitration clause is
imposed before the commencement of the litigation.275 For example,
the First Circuit has held that arbitration provisions imposed by
antitrust defendants after an alleged antitrust violation should be
applied retroactively to plaintiffs’ antitrust claims.276 Federal judges
have held that the arbitration clause need not even state that it
applies retroactively; as long as the clause has “broad wording,”
courts allow antitrust defendants to employ the clause retroactively to
compel arbitration and evade litigation.277
Price-fixing firms can load these retroactive arbitration clauses
with anti-consumer terms that effectively prevent even pre-existing
victims from pursuing any remedy.278 For example, courts in antitrust
274. See In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 230 F.R.D. 303, 312 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
275. Id. Some courts have allowed arbitration clauses to apply retroactively even to
claims that have already been filed. See, e.g., In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 962
F. Supp. 2d 840, 854–55 (D. Md. 2013) (“For those contracts where the retroactive
application is not specifically stated, the broad working of each clause and the underlying
federal policy in favor of arbitration lead to the conclusion that these clauses apply
retroactively.”).
276. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 64 (1st Cir. 2006).
277. In re Titanium Dioxide, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 854–55 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991)); see also In re Lithium Ion Batters Antitrust Litig., No. 13MD-02420-YGR, 2016 WL 5791357, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2016) (“In particular, courts
have found that the retroactive application of an arbitration agreement is not ‘wholly
groundless’ where the arbitration provision is broad.”).
278. See supra Section I.B.2.
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cases have held that retroactive arbitration clauses can include classaction waivers and thus prevent consumers from participating in a
class action based on conduct that occurred before the defendant
inserted the class-action bar in its mandatory arbitration clause.279
Such rulings are troubling because class-action waivers may
effectively prevent consumers from seeking any relief for their
injuries. Courts have also held that antitrust defendants can use
backward-applying arbitration provisions to retroactively impose a
forum selection clause.280 By selecting a particularly inconvenient
forum, price-fixing firms can manipulate the forum selection
provision to make it practicably infeasible for consumers to arbitrate
at all.281 Arbiters may enforce such provisions even when judges
would invalidate them.282
Courts justify their embrace of retroactive arbitration clauses by
again invoking the so-called congressional policy favoring arbitration.
For example, when retroactively enforcing an arbitration clause in an
antitrust case, one federal judge concluded that “the underlying
federal policy in favor of arbitration lead[s] to the conclusion that
these clauses apply retroactively.”283 The decision is typical.284 The
courts’ reliance on a federal pro-arbitration policy is, again, troubling
and mistaken because it is based on a false reading of the FAA.
Congress never intended the FAA to apply to contracts of adhesion
at all, let alone contracts of adhesion used to retroactively impose
mandatory arbitration of statutory claims based on conduct that
predated the arbitration provision.285

279. See In re Currency Conversion, 230 F.R.D. at 312 (“[A]rbitration clauses
engrafted on cardholder agreements prior to this litigation are enforceable . . . .”).
280. TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 435 F. App’x 31, 34 (2d Cir. 2011).
281. Leslie, supra note 3, at 289–90.
282. See id.
283. In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 962 F. Supp. 2d 840, 854–55 (D. Md. 2013)
(citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991)).
284. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying arbitration
clause retroactively in decision that notes the “strong federal policy of resolving any
doubts concerning arbitrability in favor of arbitration” (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)); In re Currency Conversion, 230
F.R.D. at 312; In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1107,
1124 (D. Kan. 2003) (claiming that “[t]he FAA specifically gives full force and effect to
such retroactive arbitration provisions” (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 and collecting cases)).
285. Leslie, supra note 3, at 290.
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IV. A CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CONSPIRACIES TO
ARBITRATE
The judicial embrace of a fictional congressional policy favoring
arbitration distorts how courts evaluate antitrust claims of illegal
conspiracies to arbitrate even when a court adjudicates the lawsuit
instead of sending it to arbitration. This Part presents a case study of
such distortion. In Ross v. American Express Co.,286 following a bench
trial, the district court held for the defendants, who were accused of
conspiring to impose mandatory arbitration clauses with class-action
waivers on their customers.287 The court’s extensive opinion presents
a litany of judicial errors, culminating in its failure to recognize that it
did, in fact, find an illegal conspiracy to arbitrate. Ultimately
influenced by the Supreme Court’s assertion that Congress had
endorsed arbitration over litigation, the Ross court made it harder for
plaintiffs to establish a conspiracy to arbitrate than to prove other
antitrust conspiracies.288
A. Factual Background
The alleged conspiracy was set in motion in 1999 when two
partners from a top-tier law firm approached in-house counsel for
American Express “about Amex co-sponsoring an ‘informal meeting
of senior in-house credit card counsel representing the various
segments of the U.S. credit card business’ on ‘issues of common
concern,’ including arbitration.”289 The outside lawyers organized a
conference for credit card companies.290 The conference’s “invitation
included a proposed agenda listing ‘the use of arbitration clauses in
card agreements’ as a topic” and indicated, by name, that several
major credit card companies were “likely attendees.”291 The first
meeting was attended by executives or lawyers for Amex, Citi, and
Discover, along with five card-issuing banks.292 At the time of this first
meeting, in May 1999, only First USA and Amex included arbitration
clauses in their customer contracts.293 First USA hired a consultant
“to develop a ‘forum to talk about arbitration issues,’” and that
286. 35 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 630 F. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2015).
287. Id. at 407, 415.
288. This case study is particularly important because this group “engineered” the
national “move to block class actions” by inserting class-action waivers in mandatory
arbitration clauses. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 97, at 22.
289. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 415.
290. Id. at 415–16.
291. Id. at 416.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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consultant “furnished unsolicited updates to the Issuing Banks on
competitors’ plans” regarding whether and when to adopt mandatory
arbitration clauses.294
This initial meeting led to the banks creating a group, which
called itself “the Arbitration Coalition.”295 Amex and First USA were
listed as co-chairs on invitations to the first meeting of the Arbitration
Coalition.296 One invitation to a meeting of the Arbitration Coalition
“expressed a need to do a better job in communicating with other
lenders that have adopted arbitration programs.”297 For its July 1999
meeting, which representatives from seven issuing banks attended,
the meeting’s “Arbitration Agenda” included such items as “‘working
together to turn the tide’ [and] contained the subheadings ‘sharing
best practices’ and ‘drafting fair, enforceable arbitration provisions,’”
as well as public relations issues.298 Ultimately, “[t]here were eighteen
more meetings or conference calls of the self-styled ‘Arbitration
Coalition.’”299
The members of the Arbitration Coalition often requested and
shared the content of their arbitration clauses and related documents
with each other. For example, one bank’s consultant on arbitration
issues emailed the issuing banks, requesting “if you have not already
done so, please send me the arbitration clause used by your company,
any change-in-terms notices that were involved in the adoption of the
clause, and any answers to FAQs or other explanations of the
clause.”300 The Coalition members circulated, revised, and
coordinated their “FAQs and Talking Points” regarding arbitration
clauses.301 The Coalition members asked each other for, and received,
information about whether they allowed cardholders to opt out of an
arbitration clause.302After one 2002 conference call, a representative

294. Id. at 447.
295. Id. at 416.
296. Id. at 417.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 416, 418.
301. Id. at 420 (“Following the meeting, Daily circulated revisions to the FAQs and
Talking Points to Arbitration Coalition members. The revisions reflected ‘comments
received from the group at our last meeting, as well as comments [Daily] received
internally [at Discover].’ Daily encouraged Arbitration Coalition members to ‘tailor these
documents as you see fit’ and elaborated on how Discover customized its own version.”).
302. Id. at 426 (“On July 31, 2001, Barry (Capital One) reached out to Gail (Bank
One) to ascertain whether Bank One permitted cardholders to opt-out of its arbitration
provision, and ‘[i]f yes, was there a penalty (i.e. they had to close their accounts)? And,
what percentage of people opted out?’”).
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of MBNA emailed its competitors, who were members of a Coalition
“working group,” to ask about how to deal with “cardholders
attempting to amend their agreements unilaterally to add alternate
arbitration fora.”303 Before some meetings, Coalition members were
emailed and “encouraged . . . to ‘bring a copy of your arbitration
agreement’” to the meeting.304
Through the Arbitration Coalition, bank officials often shared
with each other their non-public plans regarding implementing
arbitration clauses. For example, Chase’s in-house counsel drafted an
internal memo to memorialize the Coalition’s September 1999
meeting, which “contained non-public information relating to three
Issuing Banks’ future plans for arbitration.”305 Similarly in 2001, after
one conference call, a representative of MBNA “emailed her
colleagues that Chase has an arbitration clause under ‘active
consideration.’ The information about Chase’s arbitration clause was
not publicly available.”306 The members reported to each other when
they “had implemented arbitration provisions through change-interms notices sent to cardholders,” as well as when they were about to
do so, even when that information “was not publicly known at that
time.”307
The members of the Arbitration Coalition often inquired into
the internal decision-making of their rival banks with respect to
arbitration clauses. For example, in January 2001, one lawyer, whose
firm was involved in the Coalition, emailed a lawyer at Citi “on behalf
of ‘a client considering using arbitration clauses in credit card
agreements’ . . . to ‘confirm that Universal and Citibank (South
Dakota) [were] not currently using arbitration’ . . . ‘[and to ask
whether] the use of arbitration clauses is still under consideration and
what the major concerns are.’”308 These facts suggest that some banks
were reluctant to impose arbitration clauses unless all of their major
competitors were doing so as well, and that they wanted some
assurances that all of the members of the Coalition were imposing
arbitration clauses on their customers. One bank’s consultant working
with the Arbitration Coalition
exhorted the group that “class actions are getting out of hand”
and have become “a gaming business” and a “shakedown
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 429.
Id. at 421, 443.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 423.
Id.
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racket,” but that the group could “beat” the problem “by
working together.” His prepared remarks suggested that the
trial bar was more organized than large consumer companies
because “[a]s competitors we are conditioned to go it alone”
due to a “Century + of [the] Sherman [Act].”309
In noting the need to work together, the consultant specifically noted
the “fear of competitor exploitation . . . .”310 This sounds like the
classic cartel conundrum: no firm wants to raise price without
assurances that its rivals will also raise price because the first-moving
firm does not want its competitors to exploit the price asymmetry to
steal customers.
Taken together, the facts surrounding the creation and meetings
of the Arbitration Coalition and its subgroup, the In–House Working
Group, show a pattern of meetings among competitors before every
bank ultimately adopted arbitration clauses with class-action waivers.
The structure of the market lent itself to illegal cartelization. The
court noted that the general-purpose credit card market had “high
barriers to entry” and that the issuing banks collectively had
approximately eighty-seven percent market share.311 The district court
summarized the timeline as follows:
Together, the Issuing Banks participated in 28 meetings over a
four-year period exploring avenues to displace class actions
with arbitration of cardholder disputes. During that same
approximate period, each Issuing Bank adopted a class-actionbarring arbitration clause. While First USA implemented its
class-action-barring arbitration clause more than a year before
the first meeting, all of the other Issuing Banks noticed and
implemented clauses within a month of an Arbitration
Coalition or In–House Working Group meeting attended by
their counsel. In May 2002, Chase was the last Issuing Bank to
adopt such a clause. One month later, the multi-year pattern of
meeting nearly bimonthly dropped off. Indeed, the Arbitration
Coalition did not meet again for almost a year, and after two
follow-up conference calls, appeared to have disbanded.312
The court failed to appreciate how suspicious it was that the
group disbanded once every bank adopted mandatory arbitration.
After all, if the goal of the group was to defend arbitration clauses
and to do public relations work, the group would have needed to
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 424.
Id.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 439.
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continue after every bank imposed an arbitration clause. In contrast,
if the group’s goal was to get every firm to adopt an arbitration clause
with a class-action waiver, then the group could stop meeting after it
attained that goal.
After reviewing the evidence, the court found no agreement
among the members of the Arbitration Coalition to insert arbitration
clauses (with class-action waivers) in their contracts with customers.313
The court concluded
[w]hen the first meeting convened, only two defendants had
class-action-barring arbitration clauses in their card member
agreements. By the time the last meeting concluded, all ten of
the Issuing Banks, accounting for approximately 87% of all
credit card transactions in the United States, had adopted classaction-barring arbitration clauses in their card member
agreements. It was only by a slender reed that Plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate that the lawyers who organized these meetings
had spawned a Sherman Act conspiracy among their clients.314
The court did not apply the per se rule, but held that “under the
‘quick look’ analysis on the record presented in this case, the collusive
adoption of mandatory class-action-barring arbitration clauses, if
proven, would have constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.”315 But the court protected
conspiracies to arbitrate by making it excessively difficult to prove an

313. Id. at 456–57.
314. Id. at 456.
315. Id. (emphasis added). “Quick look” is
an “intermediate standard” and “applies in cases where per se condemnation is
inappropriate but where no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate
the anticompetitive character of an inherently suspect restraint.” In such cases, “an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that
the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers
and markets.” In other words, “quick-look analysis carries the day when the great
likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.” Under “quick
look” analysis, the competitive harm is presumed, and the “defendant must
promulgate ‘some competitive justification’ for the restraint.” “If no legitimate
justifications are set forth, the presumption of adverse competitive impact prevails
and ‘the court condemns the practice without ado.’” “If the defendant offers sound
pro-competitive justifications, however, the court must proceed to weigh the
overall reasonableness of the restraint using a full-scale rule of reason analysis.”
Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830–31 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal
citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Brown, 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) and
California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)).

96 N.C. L. REV. 381 (2018)

440

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

agreement. The Second Circuit affirmed,316 which is troubling because
the district court made several errors, as Section IV.B argues.
B.

Judicial Mistakes

The district court in Ross stated the law accurately, but it erred
when applying it. The district court correctly noted that plaintiffs
need not show a “formal agreement” in order to satisfy the agreement
element of a section 1 claim.317 Instead, “[t]he essential combination
or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be found in a
course of dealings or other circumstances as well as in any exchange
of words.”318 The agreement element is satisfied if “concert of action
is contemplated and . . . the defendants conformed to the
arrangement.”319 In addition to stating the law correctly, the court
also observed the reality that antitrust “conspiracies ‘nearly always
must be proven through inferences that may fairly be drawn from the
behavior of the alleged conspirators.’”320
The court’s application of the law, however, reveals several
errors. First, by failing to understand how antitrust cartels operate,
the Ross court misread the significance of much evidence in the case.
Most notably, the court seemed to think that anything that made the
Arbitration Coalition “resemble[] a trade association”—such as
inviting outsiders to some meetings—“cuts against any inference that
an express agreement to implement and maintain arbitration clauses
was articulated at the Arbitration Coalition meetings.”321 The judge
announced that he was “especially hesitant to infer an illicit
agreement from a record in which many of the Issuing Banks’
communications resembled those of trade associations or lobbying
groups.”322 This deference to activity resembling trade associations is
misplaced given that, for the past century, trade associations have
played a critical role in managing and stabilizing cartel operations.323
316. Ross v. Citigroup, Inc., 630 F. App’x 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2015).
317. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 437 (“No formal agreement is required to constitute an
antitrust conspiracy.”).
318. Id. (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809–10 (1946)).
319. Id. (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948)).
320. Id. (quoting Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 183 (2d Cir.
2012)).
321. Id. at 445. The court also acknowledged that “[t]his, however, does not preclude a
tacit meeting of the minds, or a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ among the Issuing Banks,” but it
still thought that the evidence of conspiracy was “ambiguous.” Id.
322. Id. at 452.
323. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do:
Determinants of Cartel Duration, 54 J.L. & ECON. 455, 456 (2011) [hereinafter Levenstein
& Suslow, Breaking Up] (“We find that cartels that rely on trade associations are less
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Many trade associations were created specifically to disguise pricefixing arrangements.324 Trade associations are the perfect cover for
cartels: their meetings explain travel records that would otherwise be
evidence of cartel activity;325 they may facilitate cartel auditing;326 and
they make it harder even for firms’ own internal antitrust compliance
programs to spot price fixing.327
Second, the Ross court seemed to use evidence of legal activity to
offset evidence of illegal activity. For example, the court noted that
the Arbitration Coalition’s lobbying activity would be protected by
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.328 But those activities were not being
challenged; they were an irrelevant distraction. Most significantly, the
court attached legal significance to its impression that most of the
information exchanged at the Arbitration Coalition meetings was
publicly available. For example, “[w]hile there is evidence that certain
of the Issuing Banks shared some internal, non-public information,
the bulk of the discussion centered on publicly available
information—including the arbitration clauses themselves.”329 The
fact that some permissible topics were discussed does not insulate the
discussion and agreements on impermissible topics from antitrust
liability. It neither explains nor justifies the potentially illegal
activities.
Third, the Ross court misunderstood and misapplied the antitrust
doctrines for inferring an agreement. The court began by correctly
noting that antitrust plaintiffs need not have direct evidence of an
agreement. Plaintiffs can prove an agreement through circumstantial
evidence, which requires “conscious parallelism” and “plus factors.”
Conscious parallelism refers to defendants consciously engaging in
parallel conduct, but this alone does not establish an agreement

likely to die a natural death.”); Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What
Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 43, 60–61 (2006) (citing literature showing
between one-third and over one-half of studied cartels “were organized and maintained by
trade associations”).
324. Leslie, supra note 233, at 660.
325. CONNOR, supra note 168, at 32 (“The major problem with face-to-face meetings,
especially for global conspiracies, is that they create a paper trail of travel records. To
overcome this problem, cartels often hold meetings concurrent with those of an otherwise
legitimate trade association.”).
326. See id. at 30 (“[For cartels] [t]he cooperation of an accounting firm is more likely
if the client is a trade association.”); Levenstein & Suslow, Breaking Up, supra note 323, at
459 (“Many cartels exchange output, sales, and price data with each other or forward data
to a third party, such as a trade association or an independent auditor.”).
327. CONNOR, supra note 168, at 462.
328. Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
329. Id. at 445.
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because firms may be engaging in similar conduct without actually
agreeing with each other.330 To show that the parallel conduct is the
product of an agreement, the plaintiff must also show the presence of
so-called “plus factors,” such as motive and opportunity to conspire,
communications among the defendants, radical and simultaneous
changes in business practices, and evidence that each individual firm’s
action would not have made sense in the absence of an agreement.331
The Ross court erred when performing this analysis.
At the outset, the court treated actual meetings of rivals in which
they were encouraged to adopt arbitration clauses—and later did so—
as mere conscious parallelism.332 That is incorrect. Conscious
parallelism would be merely that the rivals did the same thing (for
example, adopt arbitration clauses). The members of the Arbitration
Coalition exhibited much more than conscious parallelism because
the competing banks were actually meeting about arbitration clauses
and discussing how to make them the industry standard before ever
adopting them.333
Furthermore, the court mishandled the individual plus factors.
For example, although motive to conspire is a traditional plus
factor,334 the Ross court tried to distinguish between the banks’
“amply demonstrate[d]” motivation to “‘work together to turn the
tide’ in order to make arbitration an ‘acceptable forum for resolving
consumer debates’” and a motive “to collusively adopt the clauses.”335
These are not as distinct as the court found. The court itself
acknowledged that the banks were motivated to conspire to impose
industry-wide arbitration clauses because they feared that mandatory
330. See Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 227 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Parallel
conduct in itself is insufficient to state a plausible claim because it is ‘consistent with
conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business
strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.’” (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007))).
331. William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus
Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 405–06, 415 (2011).
332. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 441.
333. The only two Issuing Banks with arbitration clauses, Amex and First USA, were
the banks that “were actively involved in planning the initial meeting of the Arbitration
Coalition on July 28, 1999.” Id. at 440. Why would Amex try to convince its rival banks to
adopt arbitration clauses with class-action waivers if Amex was already protected by such
clauses in its own contracts? Because the banks with arbitration clauses needed their rivals
to include similarly anti-consumer arbitration clauses before arbitration clauses became
salient to consumers. See id. at 442 (“Even if most consumers were indifferent, this does
not foreclose a motive to keep arbitration non-salient while issuers quietly adopted it
across the board.”).
334. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 315 (2d Cir. 2015).
335. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 442 (quoting the defendants’ documentation).
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arbitration was salient.336 Consequently, consumers could start
shifting their business away from banks that required arbitration. If,
however, all banks imposed mandatory arbitration, consumers could
not avoid arbitration clauses, and banks would not fear losing
business to banks that did not impose such clauses. Furthermore, the
court explicitly recognized that industry-wide arbitration, and an
agreement not to compete on arbitration clauses, could help “keep
arbitration non-salient while issuers quietly adopted it across the
board.”337 Asserting that the banks could have been “motivated to
cooperate on efforts to sway public opinion and defend the legality of
their clauses in the courts and legislatures,”338 the court (without
citation) announced a new legal rule that “[w]hen the motive to
cooperate is just as consistent with legitimate goals as non-legitimate
goals, there can be no fair inference of collusion.”339 The court
ultimately failed to recognize the anticompetitive reasons why rival
firms would conspire to impose arbitration clauses on their
customers.340
Similarly, the court also mistreated the issue of product
standardization as a plus factor. When firms artificially standardize
their products, it counts as a plus factor, in part because this
harmonization facilitates anticompetitive agreements, such as price
fixing.341 While this inquiry generally occurs in the context of physical
products, it also applies to the standardization of contract terms.342 In
response to the plaintiffs’ argument that “the Issuing Banks’
arbitration clauses were artificially standardized as a result of their
illegal agreement to include class action waivers and to otherwise bar
336. Id. at 442 (“The Issuing Banks harbored concerns ‘that using arbitration for credit
cards could be perceived as anti-consumer.’”).
337. Id. at 442–43 (“While arbitration was not salient to most consumers at the time of
the alleged conspiracy, collusion would ensure that no Issuing Bank facilitated a rise to
salience before arbitration was firmly entrenched as the industry norm.”).
338. Id. at 443.
339. Id. The court’s reasoning is flawed. The firms had a motive to enter an illegal
agreement; the court finds so. The fact that they had a motive to cooperate in legal
ventures as well does not negate the motive to conspire.
340. See supra Section II.B.1 (describing firms’ potential benefits and incentives from
entering conspiracies to arbitrate).
341. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1952)
(“[S]tandardization of a product that is not naturally standardized facilitates the
maintenance of price uniformity.”); In re Med. X-Ray Film Antitrust Litig., 946 F. Supp.
209, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[P]lus factors include . . . the artificial standardization of
products . . . .”); see also De Jong Packing Co. v. United States, 618 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th
Cir. 1980) (finding similar wording in letters as evidence of conspiracy).
342. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., Nos. M 21–95, 05 Civ.
7116(WHP), 2012 WL 401113, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2012).
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collective redress,” the court found the evidence too “ambiguous.”343
The court reasoned that although “the Issuing Banks were asked to
provide copies of their arbitration clauses for analysis and discussion
at meetings and they intended to work together to share ‘best
practices,’” and that “the Arbitration Coalition had a special interest
in defeating class action lawsuits,” arbitration clauses were becoming
“au courant.”344 Thus, “it [was] unsurprising that over time each of the
Issuing Banks’ arbitration clauses would morph to incorporate a class
action waiver.”345 But arbitration clauses did not “morph” naturally; if
it were going to happen naturally, then the Arbitration Coalition
would not have felt the need to coordinate their efforts.
The Ross court likewise mishandled the defendants’ inability to
explain their suspicious parallel conduct. The judge noted that
“[c]ontemporaneous notes survive from only 7 of the 28 meetings.”346
While noting that it was “odd” that so little documentation exists for
meetings involving considerable “investment of attorney time and
travel expense in attending a series of meetings over a period of
years,” the court deemed the scarcity of documentation “not
alarming” because “formal minutes” are not “taken at a CLE or
client development pitch.”347 But the court had earlier noted that
these meetings did not resemble either CLE programs or client
development meetings.348 Moreover, the fact that the defendants had
no explanation for what happened at many of the meetings, with
many attendees claiming not to remember attending,349 is itself an
important plus factor for inferring an agreement.350 Thus, the court
343. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 448.
344. Id.
345. Id. The court failed to appreciate that “[o]ne way in which boilerplate could
possibly become uniform in an industry or trade is by old-fashioned collusion, the kind
that antitrust law is designed to target.” MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE
FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 41 (2013).
346. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 450 (“Other than three internal memos from the
September 29, 1999 meeting, attendees generated little work product to inform their
colleagues of what they learned at the meetings. And there is hardly any documentation
regarding substance or even attendance for the In–House Working Group meetings.”).
347. Id. at 451.
348. Id. at 444–45.
349. Id. at 451 (“Many meeting attendees remembered very little about the substance
of the meetings. At his February 2004 deposition, Heine, a ‘core’ member of the
Arbitration Coalition recalled that there ‘may have been less than five meetings’ though
he attended at least eleven meetings over the course of three years. Tasheff (Citi) did not
remember attending the May 30, 2001 Class Action Working Group meeting even though
she volunteered to lead the group’s efforts on ‘PR and Legislative Affairs’ with
MacDermott (Amex) and Barry (Capital One).”).
350. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) (“The failure
under the circumstances to call as witnesses those officers . . . [to explain] whether they
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improperly discounted the significance of these “memory gaps.”351
The lack of notes and the claims of innocence are rendered more
suspicious by the fact that the Coalition members’ denials of collusion
sometimes appear feigned and not credible. For example, regarding a
July 2001 conference call among the coalition members, “the call
participants deny that arbitration was discussed. No attendance lists,
notes, or memos of this call exist.”352 The court noted, however, that
“[g]uilelessly, the designated passcode for the conference call was
‘ARBITRATION.’”353 Such lack of explanation constitutes a plus
factor for inferring agreements in antitrust law.354
In addition to these discernable mistakes with respect to
individual plus factors, the Ross court made an overarching error by
disaggregating the evidence of conspiracy. Although the judge in Ross
correctly noted that “courts examine the existence of a conspiracy ‘as
a whole’ taking into consideration the totality of the evidence, as
opposed to ‘dismembering it and viewing its separate parts,’”355 the
judge did not follow the stated rule. The judge dismembered the
evidence of conspiracy and looked at it in isolation, finding each
individual piece of evidence to be insufficient in and of itself to prove
that the banks conspired. The court repeatedly isolated evidence in
order to diminish its legal significance. For example, after
characterizing “many of the Issuing Banks’ communications [as]
resembl[ing] those of trade associations or lobbying groups,” the
court diminished the communications among competitors as
insignificant because “[m]embership and participation in a trade
association alone does not give rise to a plausible inference of illegal
agreement.”356 The plaintiffs, of course, were not relying on this
alone.

had acted in pursuance of agreement is itself persuasive that their testimony, if given,
would have been unfavorable to appellants.”); Kovacic et al., supra note 331, at 406
(noting that “[t]he absence of a plausible, legitimate business rationale for suspicious
conduct (such as certain communications with rivals) or the presentation of contrived
rationales for certain conduct” as a plus factor); see also infra note 375 and accompanying
text.
351. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 452 (“The memory gaps of a few witnesses do not
transmogrify an honest lack of recollection into a conspiracy.”).
352. Id. at 426.
353. Id.
354. See infra note 375 and accompanying text.
355. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (quoting Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962)).
356. Id. at 452 (emphasis added) (quoting LaFlamme v. Societe Air France, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 136, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)).
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Similarly, after the court acknowledged that “[t]here is no
question that the Issuing Banks engaged in an unusually high amount
of inter-firm communications regarding arbitration,”357 it then
asserted that “a mere showing of close relations or frequent meetings
between the alleged conspirators” cannot prove the existence of a
conspiracy.358 The plaintiffs in Ross, however, had significantly more
evidence than “a mere showing” of frequent meetings. The plaintiffs
proved that the purpose of these meetings was to make mandatory
arbitration the industry standard. The court mischaracterized the
plaintiffs’ argument as inferring a conspiracy solely from
“opportunities to conspire,” which, according to the court, “would
condemn independent professional associations.”359 The plaintiffs,
though, were not focusing on the banks’ mere opportunity to
conspire; rather, the plaintiffs proved that these meetings among
competitors were specifically called to encourage agreement on
industry-wide arbitration.360 The Ross court’s approach violated the
fundamental rule of antitrust law—that judges should not
compartmentalize evidence of agreement.361
Finally, and most importantly, the Ross court failed to recognize
that it had, in fact, found an agreement among the defendants to
impose arbitration clauses with class-action waivers. When evaluating
all of the evidence, the court concluded
[i]t is clear that the Issuing Banks had an agreement to explore
collective advocacy efforts aimed at expanding the
357. Id. at 443.
358. Id. at 444 (emphasis added) (quoting H.L. Moore Drug Exch. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 662 F.2d 935, 941 (2d Cir. 1981)).
359. Id. at 444 (citing Kreuzer v. Am. Acad. of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1488–89
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
360. The defendants tried to spin the meetings as client development opportunities
initiated by a major law firm. Id. But the Ross court acknowledged that “[t]he number of
meetings over a sustained period devoted to the topic of arbitration far exceeds a level
normally associated with client development pitches or CLEs.” Id. Furthermore, if this
was true client development, why have all of the rivals in the same room at the same time
discussing how to impose the same anti-consumer terms in their contracts?
Moreover, at points the attorney leaders of the Arbitration Coalition sought
information from the banks that was inconsistent with either client development or CLE.
See id. at 444–45 (“The generation of joint work product, such as the FAQs project, is
inconsistent with client development efforts because law firms do not generally parcel
work assignments out to clients. And potential client invitees are not usually called on to
educate one another or share internal analysis. Indeed, the significant level of cooperation
among attendees was atypical of a CLE or client development pitch. Any lawyer would
agree that CLEs and client development pitches do not typically involve homework
assignments, the formation of sub-groups, or the development of a public relations
campaign.”).
361. See Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962).
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enforceability of arbitration clauses and to establish classaction-barring arbitration as an industry norm. Direct evidence
of this agreement abounds in meeting agendas, solicitations to
fund amicus briefs and research, and willingness to explore joint
action such as the FAQs project or self-regulation efforts.362
Thus, the court held that the defendants “had an agreement . . . to
establish class-action-barring arbitration as an industry norm.”363 That
agreement is a conspiracy to arbitrate. To agree to have arbitration
clauses with class-action waivers as the industry norm is to agree that
every firm in the industry will impose such arbitration clauses, as they
all did following the meetings of the Arbitration Coalition.364 This
agreement among competitors to have industry-wide arbitration
clauses is illegal.365
The court’s description of the defendants’ actions and motives
also demonstrates another mishandling of plus-factor analysis and
another example of how the court did, in fact, find an illegal
362. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 452.
363. Id.
364. The district judge criticized the plaintiffs for reading evidence of an agreement “to
establish class-action-barring arbitration as an industry norm . . . as evidence of a separate,
illegal agreement to collusively adopt and maintain class-action-barring arbitration
clauses.” Id. But, in the context of the Arbitration Coalition, these are equivalent.
In a way, the Ross court seemed to distinguish between an industry effort to
standardize contract terms and an agreement among rivals to impose those standardized
terms on their customers. This distinction is not persuasive. As Professor Mark Patterson
has noted in the context of standardized contracts more generally, “it would make little
sense for the parties to engage in a standardization effort were their uniform use of the
contract not an assumption underlying that effort.” Patterson, supra note 129, at 394; see
also id. at 395 (“[The] benefits of standardization arise from the widespread use of the
standardized contract. Therefore, the effort makes sense if the contracts are to be
adopted—as final contracts or as defaults from which negotiation begins—uniformly, but
does not make sense in the absence of an understanding that they will all adopt the
contract.”). Patterson explains that because standardization efforts are costly, the
participants must expect a return on their investment of time and money. Id. at 406. He
explains: “One possibility—the anticompetitive one—is that the standardization will
constitute or facilitate collusion. To avoid an inference of that possibility, it seems that the
standard-setters should be able to offer an alternative explanation of how their costs will
be recovered.” Id.
Moreover, in its application, the court seemed to downplay the fact that “[a]fter
the Arbitration Coalition ceased meetings, all the Issuing Banks had similar clauses.”
Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 448. Yet, that is strong evidence of agreement. See infra note 378
and accompanying text.
365. See supra Section II.A (discussing Paramount Famous Lasky). Moreover, because
the court found that “[d]irect evidence of this agreement abounds,” Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at
452 (emphasis added), the court did not even need to consider the circumstantial evidence
of conscious parallelism and plus factors, an analysis that the court ultimately performed
incorrectly. See supra notes 334–54 and accompanying text. Circumstantial evidence is
unnecessary when there is direct evidence of an illegal agreement.
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agreement but failed to realize it. Traditionally, helping one’s
competitors perfect their contracts would be considered against a
business’s self-interest and would count as a plus factor.366 The Ross
court conceded that the Arbitration Coalition “meetings evidenced a
degree of communication and collaboration beyond what one would
expect from a CLE or a trade association,” but it concluded that the
meetings were not against self-interest of the banks that already had
arbitration clauses; instead, it asserted that those banks needed to
“educat[e] their competitors on how to ‘get it right’” in order to attain
the “goal of establishing arbitration as an industry norm.”367 In other
words, the court reasoned that the information-sharing meetings were
not against the banks’ self-interest because they facilitated the goal of
industry-wide arbitration. That is the cartel agreement: an agreement
that every bank in the industry impose mandatory arbitration on its
customers.368
C.

Inappropriate Deference to Arbitration

The Ross opinion raises many important questions. How can a
court find an illegal conspiracy and not realize it? Why did the Ross
court mishandle plus-factor analysis? Why did it hold that
conspiracies to arbitrate are not per se illegal? In short, why did the
Ross court make so many mistakes? All of the questions share the
same answer: an unhealthy deference to arbitration.
The Ross court’s deference to arbitration clauses began with its
decision not to apply antitrust law’s per se rule. Despite the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Paramount Famous Lasky, which condemned
conspiracies to arbitrate as per se illegal,369 the Ross court cited the
so-called federal policy favoring arbitration—as well as the Supreme
Court’s pro-arbitration decisions in Concepcion and Italian Colors,
among others—to hold that conspiracies to arbitrate are not per se
illegal.370 Remarkably, the Ross court never mentioned Paramount
366. See In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 399 (3d Cir.
2015) (“[E]vidence of actions against self-interest means there is evidence of behavior that
is inconsistent with a competitive market.”).
367. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 448.
368. Similarly, every member of a traditional price-fixing cartel will share information
with its competitors in order to facilitate the cartel’s goal of raising market price. That
does not make the information sharing in an individual firm’s self-interest as that phrase is
used in antitrust law. Rather, the individual firm benefits because the act strengthens the
cartel.
369. See supra Section II.A.
370. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 454–55. The Ross court held that the per se rule does not
apply to conspiracies to arbitrate because “the Supreme Court has expanded the reach of
consumer arbitration clauses in the past thirty years.” Id. That is not a reason to not apply
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Famous Lasky.371 Thus, the alleged congressional preference for
arbitration seems to have affected substantive antitrust law.
A similar pro-arbitration bend seems to have skewed the court’s
interpretation of the facts. If judges regarded arbitration conspiracies
as they do other antitrust conspiracies, they would undoubtedly find
an agreement among competitors on analogous facts. Take the facts
of Ross and replace “arbitration” with “raising prices,” and the
presence of an agreement becomes clear:
 a group of competitors created a group called the “Pricing
Coalition”;
 the stated goal of competitors’ coalition was to make higher
prices the industry norm;
 the group of competitors met 28 times;
 the competitors shared non-public information about future
pricing plans;
 the competitors have no notes or memories of most of their
meetings, though for one of these note-less meetings—at which
the competitors claim raising price was not discussed—the
passcode for the conference call was “Raising Prices”;
 every firm in the coalition did, in fact, raise prices to the level
articulated as the preferred “industry norm”; and
 after every firm in the coalition has raised prices to the
“industry norm,” the group disbands.
In price-fixing jurisprudence, such a fact pattern clearly
demonstrates an agreement under antitrust law. The formation of a
group with the goal of raising prices,372 the holding of meetings among
competitors,373 the sharing of non-public information about future
the per se rule; that is the reason why conspiracies to arbitrate are more valuable.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s embrace of unilaterally imposed arbitration clauses is
irrelevant to the legality of conspiracies to arbitrate. After all, antitrust law recognizes a
firm’s right to raise price unilaterally, but still condemns conspiracies to raise price as per
se illegal.
371. Instead, the Ross court relied on Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1978).
Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 454. Drayer incorrectly suggested that Paramount Famous Lasky
was not a per se case. See Drayer, 572 F.2d at 355; supra notes 98–118 (explaining why
Paramount Famous Lasky is a per se case). More importantly, the court in Drayer relied
on the inaccurate notion that “policy favors arbitration” and relied heavily on the fact that
the unique regulations of the securities industry at issue. See Drayer, 572 F.2d at 353, 357–
58. Thus, Drayer was both incorrect and distinguishable.
372. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
373. See In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 826 F. Supp. 1019, 1039 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (“If
proven, evidence of any meetings[,] . . . telephone conversations, or other electronic
communications in pursuit and furtherance of the alleged conspiracy would be the most
relevant evidence that could be introduced in proving the allegations of plaintiffs’
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pricing plans,374 the lack of an explanation for many meetings,375 the
success in raising price,376 and the pretextual justifications for their
meetings377 would be sufficient to prove an agreement in the context
of price-fixing conspiracies. The fact that uniform action occurred
after these meetings provides additional evidence of an agreement.378
The important point here is not that price fixing is per se illegal; it is
that these facts are sufficient to show an agreement for antitrust
purposes. If such facts show an agreement for a price-fixing
conspiracy, they should show an agreement for a conspiracy to
arbitrate.379
complaint of price fixing.”). In price-fixing cases, courts hold evidence of defendants’
meetings to be significant because meetings allow factfinders to infer that the prices were
discussed. See Weit v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 641 F.2d 457, 478 (7th Cir.
1981). But the facts of Ross are even more damning because we know that the defendants
discussed making mandatory arbitration the industry-wide standard.
374. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 211 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]xchanges of future
price information are considered especially anticompetitive.”).
375. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225–26 (1939); VI PHILLIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1417c, at 109 (2d ed. 2003)
(“Because contacts among competitors present a definite danger to competition, it is
reasonable as a policy matter to require the companies that are meeting to explain their
actions. When an innocent explanation is not forthcoming or is not plausible, the suspicion
arises that the contact was made in furtherance of a conspiracy to suppress competition.”);
see also Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 98-2847, 1999 WL
691840, at *14 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1999) (per curiam) (finding forgotten conversations about
important subjects as strong evidence of an illegal agreement to restrain trade).
376. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 328 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming the
holding of an illegal price-fixing agreement because “motives, coupled with the
unambiguous increase in the prices, . . . was sufficient to confirm that price fixing was the
goal, and the result, of the conspiracy”).
377. In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 504 F. Supp. 2d 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The
Arbitration Coalition’s disbandment after the banks implemented uniform arbitration
clauses shows that the group’s assertion of public relations and joint legal defense
cooperation were pretextual.
378. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 241 (1996) (“Antitrust law also
sometimes permits judges or juries to premise antitrust liability upon little more than
uniform behavior among competitors, preceded by conversations implying that later
uniformity might prove desirable . . . .”); see also Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 239 F. Supp. 2d 180, 187 (D.R.I. 2003) (“Proof of these plus
factors may include evidence of meetings attended by the defendants followed shortly
thereafter by parallel behavior that goes beyond what would be expected absent an
agreement.”), aff’d, 373 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2004).
379. By failing to examine the evidence through an antitrust lens, the Ross court failed
to understand the nature of agreements among competitors. For example, in
characterizing the discussions among competitors to adopt class-action-barring arbitration
clauses, the judge concluded that the “aggressive communications to various Issuing Banks
strike this Court as aimed at persuasion rather than collusion.” Ross v. Am. Express Co.,
35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Trying to persuade one’s competitors to raise
price in direct meetings, followed by one’s competitors raising price, would constitute
illegal price fixing. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948)
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The Ross court, however, apparently interpreted the analogous
facts more leniently because the alleged conspiracy involved the
collusive imposition of arbitration clauses. Despite the fact that
conspiracies to arbitrate impose serious anticompetitive harms380 and
can strengthen an underlying price-fixing conspiracy,381 the court was
relatively sympathetic to the goals of arbitration conspiracies.382 The
heart of the problem is that courts view arbitration as fundamentally
good and, consequently, interpret business behavior regarding
arbitration clauses as innocent and innocuous.383 This appears to have
distorted the Ross court’s interpretation of the facts. Whatever one’s
view of arbitration, the facts clearly prove an agreement to make
mandatory arbitration the industry norm, as the court itself found but
did not appreciate.384
V. MOVING FORWARD
The case study in Part IV illustrates in more specific detail the
root of the problems identified in Part III: federal courts are so
enamored with arbitration clauses that they fail to recognize the
dangers and illegality of conspiracies to arbitrate. In misguided
deference to the imagined virtues of mandatory arbitration, courts
have misapplied equitable doctrines and antitrust law in a manner

(“It is not necessary to find an express agreement in order to find a conspiracy. It is
enough that a concert of action is contemplated and that the defendants conformed to the
arrangement.”); cf. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 227 (“Acceptance by competitors,
without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary
consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to
establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.”).
380. See supra Section II.B.
381. See supra Section II.C.
382. One might argue that this exercise is unfair because arbitration clauses are legal,
while price fixing is not. But that is a false comparison. Any firm—even a monopolist—can
raise price legally so long as it does so unilaterally. It is agreements to raise price that
violate antitrust law. Similarly, the legality of individually imposed arbitration clauses does
not exonerate conspiracies to arbitrate. Nor should it prevent judges and juries from
finding an agreement to impose arbitration clauses when competitors’ communications
and actions indicate that conclusion.
383. The Ross court treated coordination regarding arbitration as inherently innocent.
For example, when the Arbitration Coalition met in April 2001, one organizer
“characterized the Arbitration Coalition as ‘the only organization uniquely devoted to
protecting industry use of arbitration of consumer disputes.’” Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 424.
If a “Price-Raising Coalition” in an industry bragged that it was “the only organization
uniquely devoted to raising price in an industry,” that evidence standing alone would be
sufficiently damning to prove that simultaneous price increases had been the result of a
Coalition-orchestrated agreement. But the Ross court treated the Arbitration Coalition’s
proclamation as beyond reproach.
384. See supra notes 362–68 and accompanying text.
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that rewards misconduct. As a consequence, courts embolden firms to
conspire to use arbitration clauses to cloak their illegal activities from
scrutiny because, after their customers are denied access to courts and
to class-aggregating procedures, the victims of illegal conduct often
have no financially feasible procedure to protect their rights. By
collectively manipulating the terms in their arbitration clauses, lawbreaking firms may be able to evade legal liability altogether.
Federal judges can begin to prevent these inequitable outcomes
by taking several actions. First and foremost, when plaintiffs allege
that the defendants conspired to impose arbitration clauses, a court
must adjudicate these claims.385 Sending litigation involving
arbitration conspiracies to an arbiter entails enforcing the self-same
conspiracy. When federal judges compel arbitration in these cases, the
plaintiffs’ alleged antitrust injury—being forced into the suboptimal,
less-protective arbitration process—is inflicted by the very federal
court tasked with remedying such injury.
Federal judges should not interpret or apply arbitration clauses
expansively. For example, courts should not allow defendants to
apply pre-dispute arbitration clauses retroactively to cover their
previous misconduct. To so do rewards and protects illegal activity.
Neither should courts invoke equitable estoppel to expand the reach
of arbitration clauses. Equitable considerations demand that antitrust
defendants be denied the protections of their co-conspirators’
arbitration clauses. Accordingly, courts should stop turning equitable
principles upside down by holding that illegal liaisons warrant
estoppel against a conspiracy’s victims.386
In addition, the Ross case study demonstrates that a judicial
hearing alone is not sufficient to protect conspiracy victims. Judges
considering allegations of arbitration conspiracies should not view the
evidence and circumstances through a pro-arbitration lens. Even if
mandatory arbitration were an effective and fair forum for consumer

385. One potential downside of requiring litigation of arbitration conspiracies is that
antitrust plaintiffs may attempt to evade arbitration clauses by including allegations of a
conspiracy to arbitrate in their complaints. This is not a problem for several reasons. First,
the claims must survive a motion to dismiss. Second, requiring plaintiffs’ claims of a
conspiracy to impose arbitration clauses be decided by judges, not arbitrators, is the
correct result because Congress never intended consumer or antitrust claims to be subject
to pre-dispute mandatory arbitration in the first place. Finally, this would not be a
dramatic change so much as it is a return to form. All federal antitrust claims were decided
by federal judges for almost the entire first century of the Sherman Act until the Supreme
Court arbitrarily changed the rules in the 1980s, opening the door to antitrust arbitration.
See supra notes 25–28, 34–45 and accompanying text.
386. See supra Section III.C.
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claims—which it is not387—that should not affect the inquiry into
whether the defendants agreed to impose arbitration clauses. Yet the
Ross court found no agreement in part because of the court’s
deference to arbitration. If courts better appreciated the downsides of
mandatory arbitration, including the harms inflicted by conspiracies
to arbitrate, they might be more appropriately suspicious of collective
efforts by firms to prevent their customers from litigating in court.
Finally, it bears noting that a return to the per se approach
against conspiracies to arbitrate does not necessarily condemn all
industry efforts to encourage arbitration. Antitrust law distinguishes
between naked restraints and ancillary restraints.388 Naked
agreements are more likely to be condemned as per se illegal.389 The
facts of Ross resembled a naked agreement, in that the plaintiffs
alleged that the competitors got together for the purpose and effect of
collusively imposing arbitration clauses with class-action waivers on
their customers. An industry’s conversion to mandatory arbitration
need not be so naked, however. In some trades, a central body
propounds a standardized contract that includes a mandatory
arbitration provision.390 So long as members of the industry are free to
accept or reject this contract and its individual terms, antitrust courts
should not condemn a firm in a competitive market for unilaterally
deciding to adopt a standardized contract with an arbitration clause.
At the same time, judges should also be aware of the possibility
of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy. Such a conspiracy could involve a
trade organization or arbitration provider convincing competing firms
to concurrently impose mandatory arbitration as a means of reducing
their exposure to liability without alienating customers, who would
387. See supra Section I.B.
388. See Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“A court [in an antitrust case] must distinguish between ‘naked’ restraints, those in which
the restriction on competition is unaccompanied by new production or products, and
‘ancillary’ restraints, those that are part of a larger endeavor whose success they
promote.”). See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1221 (2008).
389. Id.
390. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 470, 470 n.1 (1989) (noting that standardized contract promulgated by American
Institute of Architects contained arbitration clause).
One example of this scenario is the standard form contract created by the
American Institute of Architects (“AIA”), which is “the ‘dominant’ provider of building
design and construction documents[] and supplies a wide range of documents that are
commonly used in the construction industry.” Patterson, supra note 129, at 352 (citing
AIA website’s collection of “Document Synopses by Family”). The AIA standardized
contract requires mandatory arbitration, as well as an altered statute of limitations and
waiver of consequential damages. Id. at 353.
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otherwise purchase from a seller that did not require mandatory
arbitration.391 If a trade organization requires its members to impose
arbitration clauses on its customers or employees, that comes closer
to being a naked restraint.392 At a minimum, it looks less like truly
independent decision-making.
Determining whether an industry’s transition to market-wide
mandatory arbitration resulted from a naked conspiracy, a hub-andspoke conspiracy, or independent decision-making will be a function
of the facts of each individual case. In making this determination,
however, courts should be alert to avoid the judicial mistakes
highlighted in Section III.C and the Ross case study. In particular,
judges should not allow the false premise of a federal policy favoring
arbitration to cloud their judgment as to whether the defendants
actually agreed to jointly impose arbitration clauses.
In sum, if industry-wide mandatory arbitration is the result of a
conspiracy among rival firms to collectively impose arbitration clauses
on their customers, these firms have violated antitrust law.
Consequently, federal courts should hold the co-conspirators
accountable.
CONCLUSION
Private litigation is vital for the enforcement of antitrust laws.393
Because private enforcement of antitrust laws can make price fixing
unprofitable, price fixers would like to undermine private
enforcement. One way to do this would be to dismantle or blunt the
pro-plaintiff aspects of antitrust law. For example, price-fixing firms
would like to ensure that antitrust damages are not trebled; that
successful antitrust plaintiffs do not recover their attorneys’ fees and
391. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 314 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that
“courts have long recognized the existence of ‘hub-and-spoke’ conspiracies in which an
entity at one level of the market structure, the ‘hub,’ coordinates an agreement among
competitors at a different level, the ‘spokes’”).
392. Courts fail to appreciate the significance of such conspiracies to arbitrate. See, e.g.,
Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Compelling all member firms to
include an arbitration clause in contracts with registered representatives does not inhibit
the freedom of any firm in competing for business or of any investor in seeking the firm
that will give him the best and cheapest service.”).
393. Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for
Private Antitrust Enforcement, 48 GA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2013). This is particularly true with
respect to arbitration conspiracies. In theory, government officials could litigate in court
against alleged members of a conspiracy to arbitrate. Buffon & Wolson, supra note 51, at
34 (“Similarly, an arbitration provision will not prevent a government enforcement action,
because the government will not be a party to the agreement.”). In the current political
climate, this seems unlikely.
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costs; that antitrust plaintiffs cannot receive injunctive relief; that
antitrust statutes of limitation are truncated; and that victims of
antitrust violations cannot pursue class actions to hold antitrust
violators accountable. Price fixers cannot achieve these goals directly.
So, they attempt to achieve them indirectly through mandatory
arbitration. Arbitration clauses do not simply shift adjudication of
antitrust claims from public courts to private forums; instead, firms
use these clauses to attempt to dismantle the pro-plaintiff aspects of
antitrust law.
When firms in an industry each unilaterally impose mandatory
arbitration clauses on their customers, that is a tragedy; when firms in
an industry agree with each other to impose mandatory arbitration
clauses on their customers, that is an antitrust law violation. How did
we go from a world in which conspiracies to arbitrate were per se
illegal to our current one in which federal courts hold that it is
perfectly legal for competitors to agree to make arbitration the
industry standard? The answer has less to do with a failure of
antitrust law than a breakdown of sensible arbitration jurisprudence.
Courts err when they invoke the so-called federal policy in favor of
arbitration as the justification for preventing consumers from
litigating claims of conspiracy to arbitrate. Congress never created
such a federal policy. Congress never intended consumer claims to be
forced into arbitration. It never intended antitrust claims, let alone
conspiracy-to-arbitrate claims, to be subject to mandatory arbitration.
The effects of the false belief in a federal policy favoring
arbitration are numerous. First, it leads courts to divert conspiracy-toarbitrate claims from court to arbitration, where valid claims are less
likely to succeed. Second, it leads to the misapplication of equitable
estoppel principles in order to allow non-signatories to compel
arbitration. Third, it allows lawbreakers to retroactively prevent their
victims from suing in court. And, fourth, as shown by the Ross case
study, it makes it less likely for courts to find an agreement even
when one exists.
Courts compound their mistakes by misapplying ancillary legal
doctrines, such as equitable estoppel. Congress certainly never
intended non-signatories to be able to enforce their co-conspirators’
arbitration clauses against victims of illegal price fixing. Some courts
have fetishized arbitration clauses to the point that they are ignoring
both the legislative history of the FAA and the practical
consequences of their pro-arbitration decisions. The solution is as
simple as judges correctly reading the language and legislative history
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of the FAA and as difficult as having the federal judiciary admit that
they have been misapplying these texts for over three decades.
The stakes are high. Although businesses tout arbitration as an
efficient way to resolve disputes, firms have wielded arbitration
clauses as a weapon to effectively prevent consumers from bringing
any legal claims against businesses. They structure their arbitration
clauses to circumvent both pro-consumer laws and the protections of
judicial procedures designed to create a level playing field upon which
to resolve disputes. As often written, mandatory arbitration clauses
are anti-consumer: they deprive consumers of any meaningful means
to remedy legal wrongs, whether that be injuries from unsafe
products, deceptive overcharges, or paying an illegally fixed price.
When competitors conspire to impose arbitration clauses on their
customers, the firms violate antitrust law. Federal courts should hold
the conspirators accountable. While an industry-wide norm of
mandatory arbitration does not alone violate section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, when competing firms agree among
themselves to adopt and pursue that norm, that constitutes a
conspiracy for antitrust purposes. Courts should never invoke any socalled federal policy favoring arbitration to negate finding an
agreement when one exists.

